

Towards Effective Conservation Strategies

The application of strategic principles to increase the impact and sustainability of WWF conservation efforts

Prepared for WWF Netherlands, WWF United States and WWF United Kingdom

23 March 2007

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Acknowledgement

This document is the fruit of a joint exercise by WWF US, UK and the Netherlands, facilitated by a team from AIDEnvironment. This is in no way intended as a final word on conservation strategy; rather, it is a description of the state of the art in current WWF practice and thinking and part of an ongoing process to design, evaluate and implement new conservation strategies. The authors would like to thank WWF and the three country coordinators for the opportunity to participate in this process and for their feedback on earlier versions of this document. A special word of thanks to all the resource persons from the WWF network who supplied case studies and comments within very tight deadlines, to Ellen de Wolf for providing maps and images and to Mars Aubri for revision and lay-out.

Amsterdam, 23 March 2007,

Jan Joost Kessler en Jan Maarten Dros

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1. Introduction

In the last 10 years, WWF developed in their several projects and programmes new approaches to achieve more effective conservation. This was explicitly done in the Action Network Programme of WWF International, the WWF US Large Scale Conservation Programme, the WWF NL Partners for Wetlands Programme, and the WWF Netherlands Focal Programme. Parallel to these initiatives, new approaches also emerged (more implicitly) from the experiences in several other WWF global programmes, especially those in the context of the Ecoregional approach to conservation. There is a general feeling that it is time to take stock from these experiences, draw lessons, and identify common elements.

This study was initiated jointly by WWF Netherlands, WWF-United Kingdom and WWF-United States with the aim to identify generic strategic principles for conservation that have emerged from a number of recent WWF global programmes. The overall objective is to improve WWF's effectiveness, and possibly adjust its 'way of doing business', by application of these strategic principles.

This report presents the strategic principles, including a detailed description and their underlying rationale. It is demonstrated how these principles, when applied together, will help design and implement a coherent conservation strategy for conservation programmes. The findings are supported by case studies describing the application of the principles for selected WWF programmes. Lastly, the boundary conditions for successful application of these strategic principles are described. These conditions can be considered as cross-cutting principles, and relate to organisational and institutional issues mainly.

Together with the three WWF initiators, we have identified over 20 large WWF conservation programmes across the world in which in the last decade the strategic principles have been applied. From these programmes, the following nine cases were selected to demonstrate how implicit or explicit application of strategic principles has contributed to conservation:

- I. Integrated Water Resource Management project, Kafue River, Zambia
- II. West Africa Marine Ecoregion (WAMER)
- III. Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) project in Namibia
- IV. Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)
- V. The Forest Conversion Initiative
- VI. Eastern Himalayas Ecoregional Program (TAL) in Nepal
- VII. South West Amazon Ecoregion Program in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru
- VIII. Colombia: Chocó-Darién Ecoregional program
- IX. Living Rivers: Rhine, Danube and Yangtze

This report is built up as follows:

Chapter 2 gives a brief background on the development of policies and strategies within WWF, showing how the strategic principles that have now emerged have their roots in a long history and tradition within WWF;

Chapter 3 introduces the seven identified strategic principles, their coherence and relation with WWF's management cycle;

Chapter 4 gives a more detailed description of each of the seven strategic principles;

Chapter 5 highlights the main conditions (crosscutting organisational and institutional issues) for WWF to apply successfully the strategic principles;
Chapter 6 gives the full case study descriptions with descriptions of how each selected programme has explicitly or implicitly applied the seven strategic principles.

2. Historical background¹

This section describes the evolution of policies and strategies within WWF, and shows how the strategic principles that are subject of this study have their roots in the history and tradition within WWF.

Established in 1961, WWF now operates in more than 100 countries, with national offices in 25 of these. WWF's strategy towards achieving conservation has changed over time. At first, WWF focused its conservation efforts at establishing *national parks*. WWF was one of the first to tackle conservation problems at a *global scale*; in 1975 WWF had its first *worldwide campaign*, the Tropical Rainforest Campaign, raising money for tropical rainforest areas to be managed as national parks or reserves.

By the end of the 1970s, WWF had grown from a small organisation that concentrated on problems such as endangered species and habitat destruction, into an international institution that recognised the need to *integrate development with conservation*. In the early 1980s, in collaboration with IUCN and UNEP, the joint World Conservation Strategy was published which recommended a *holistic approach* to conservation and the importance of *using natural resources in a sustainable way*. In line with this strategy, a new approach emerged which was labelled as Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs). The approach was based on the assumption that win-win opportunities can be found between *local people's needs and conservation objectives*.

The 1990s began with the launch of a revised mission and strategy. The expanded mission reiterates WWF's commitment to nature conservation, and classifies the organisation's work into three interdependent categories: the preservation of biological diversity, promoting the concept of sustainable use of resources, and reducing wasteful consumption and pollution. The 1990 strategy also aimed to decentralise WWF's decision-making processes, and to increase *cooperation with local communities*. In 1991, WWF, IUCN, and UNEP joined forces again to publish the report "Caring for the Earth - A Strategy for Sustainable Living" – in which the need to reduce *pollution and to raise awareness on climate change* and the need to reduce consumption of fossil fuels were highlighted. More recently, the formulation and adoption of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the United Nations has been for many WWF offices an incentive to strengthen the mutual relationships between conservation and development.

By the late 1990's, it became clear that ICDPs were not sufficiently effective to reverse global trends of biodiversity loss, and positive impacts were generally limited in size or proved not to be sufficiently sustainable. In response to these observations, a range of new strategic approaches have been formulated and tested. One such approach emerged around the Earth Summit in 1992, whereby WWF built stronger *relationships with the business community*, as a key actor that offered opportunities to change global driving forces. In addition, WWF developed a stronger focus at *(government) policy work*, aimed at influencing policy makers and decision makers, recognising that changes at higher levels can have major spin-off to lower levels. Yet another approach aimed at assuring that local impacts are embedded in processes designed to achieve greater conservation impacts, i.e. have *impacts at eco-regional levels*.

¹ Adapted from www.panda.org website.

To provide thematic focus to the global programme, the concept of *target driven activities* was developed, resulting in global thematic programs (forests, freshwater, marine, species, and climate change) with measurable goals and milestones, i.e. what WWF is doing.

The identification of *priority ecoregions* defined the geographical focus of WWF's global work, or where WWF is acting. Over the past years, a lot of experience was gained implementing conservation programmes on ecoregional or global scale. This document summarises the most important principles for conservation success of large conservation programmes. The relevance, main characteristics, and applicability of these strategic principles are explored in this document.

3. Introduction to strategic principles

Objectives and applicability

As described in the previous section, the WWF global themes determine *what* WWF does, and the Priority Ecoregions determine *where* WWF operates. The strategic principles as introduced in this study provide guidance on *how* WWF can achieve major conservation impacts. The strategic principles can help define the overall strategy and provide guidance to WWF programmes, in conjunction with existing standards and guidelines. The overall objective of the application of strategic principles is to improve programme management and thus increase the effectiveness of WWF's programmes.

In the regions where WWF works, programmes often have to deal with complex conservation problems characterised by:

- A mix of threats, underlying factors and root causes from different sectors;
- A range of influential key actors² from private, public and civic sector, often found at multiple levels (local, national and global), with interrelated and often conflicting views and interests;
- Complex relations between human development, poverty, resource management and biodiversity;
- International market links with north-south trade of commodities, influx of (foreign) capital and economic dependency on certain natural resources;
- Poor natural resource management, poor or absent environmental legislation, and/or poor enforcement of such legislation.

The seven strategic principles are particularly useful for bigger programmes that deal with such complex conservation problems. These programmes tend to be relatively large-scale and long-term. The strategic principles can help design a long-term strategy for such programmes. Large-scale programmes are often characterised by a modular approach.³ The strategic principles can help set priorities and assure coherence between modules. However, the strategic principles can also be applied to WWF programmes or projects at smaller scales or with a narrower scope.

The intensity and sequence of the application of the strategic principles may vary between different programmes. This depends upon the context and objectives of these programmes. Some strategic principles are particularly applicable to programmes that have to deal with major external threats and involvement of powerful actors (e.g. strategic partnerships with private sector); programmes that are located in regions where internal poverty and socio-cultural problems predominate would focus upon other strategic principles (e.g. capacity building of civil society partners).⁴

² In this document we use the term 'actors' as being all the players that have direct or indirect influence on the conservation problem, while stakeholders are only the 'primary actors', i.e. those with an immediate interest and relation with the ecosystem. Thus, actors are found at different levels, while stakeholders are mainly found at local level.

³ Large programmes are often organised by relatively autonomous sectoral or thematic modules, which together form the overall (ecoregional) programme strategy. Here terminology may differ between different WWF offices, but there is general agreement that there are separate modules, sub-projects, themes or strategic orientations, falling within the overall programme strategy.

⁴ One could make a distinction between 'capital driven' and 'poverty-driven' mechanisms of ecosystem degradation, the first being dominated by external threats, export-driven resource extraction and capital inputs,

More specifically, the strategic principles can be applied:

- During the define and design phases, to define the overall programme strategy and its modules;
- during mid-term evaluation of the programme, for adaptation of the programme;
- during reviews or evaluations to redefine objectives or strategy of new programmes.

Seven strategic principles – brief introduction

Below, the seven strategic principles are introduced. Some principles may appear ‘tactical’ rather than ‘strategic’ (for example, ‘appealing model’ and ‘exit strategy’) but deserve to be treated at a strategic level, as they are part of the long-term strategy. Applied together, they form the basis for a long-term conservation strategy applicable at the largest spatial levels (national, ecoregional, global). More elaborate descriptions are given in chapter 4.

1. A large-scale programme should have (one or more) **conservation change mechanisms (SP 1)** to address (one or more) direct or indirect threats. The mechanism may require interventions at different levels (global to local) and requires short-term conservation opportunities or ‘triggers’ embedded in a medium- to long term vision. The combination of short term gains with long term sustainability will enable the realisation of sustainable conservation results;
2. Each conservation change mechanism should have potential to influence, and generate benefits for at least one **strategic conservation partner (SP 2)**, usually from a non-conservation sector, who will be instrumental in wider adoption of the change mechanism; together, the set of conservation mechanisms at different levels will address the interests of most key actors.
3. The strategy should address issues and actors at different levels, in such a way that synergy is created in addressing key drivers locally, nationally and globally; this is referred to as **vertical integration (SP 3)**.
4. The programme should develop one or more **appealing models (SP 4)**, which demonstrate the usefulness of each conservation change mechanism, also beyond the program area; different models may be associated with different change mechanisms.
5. WWF’s conservation work should be embedded in a **strong conservation and development coalition (SP 5)**, including WWF’s natural conservation partners, relevant government agencies and civil society organisations; collaboration is based on complementary roles and capacity building is crucial to build up capabilities to manage the programme and empower civil society.
6. Through demonstration of effective conservation change mechanisms, **widespread adoption (SP 6)** should take place, thus generating meaningful conservation impacts; strategic conservation partners are key to widespread adoption.
7. A successful **exit strategy (SP 7)** identifies WWF’s role after the programme has been successfully established; can it pull out altogether, stay involved as advisor or monitor or is a long-term (field) presence required to ensure conservation of biodiversity in the long run?

the second by internal poverty (“tragedy of the commons”) often associated with resource depletion and socio-cultural problems. This distinction is based on extensive work on the root causes of deforestation and seems to have wider applicability to conservation problems.

Seven strategic principles – coherence

The seven strategic principles (SPs) are closely related and constitute a coherent approach when applied together. A prerequisite to successful application of the seven SPs, is the existence of a conservation vision for the programme (other conditions for application of the principles are treated in chapter 5). The seven SPs can help further strengthen and work out the vision, by taking into account perspectives such as non-conservation partners, widespread adoption etcetera, and in doing so will ensure that the vision is being shared by key stakeholders and other actors.

Application of strategic principles in the WWF management cycle

The following management cycle with its five phases has been developed as part of the WWF standard of conservation project and programme management.




Figure 1 WWF conservation project/ programme management cycle

The seven strategic principles are embedded in the management cycle and are useful to strengthen and focus the existing WWF standard at certain phases. As such, they should be integrated and not be considered as a parallel or separate approach. As stated before, the seven strategic principles are interrelated and in their totality will help design the programme strategy

The following scheme provides some details as to how and when strategic principles can be applied within the project and programme management cycle phases.

The strategic principles may be grouped into three clusters linked to the five phases of the management cycle (see also Figure 1):

- The first three principles are most relevant during the *define and design phases* of the programme: conservation change mechanism, strategic conservation partner, and vertical linkages. These three principles are linked. The one without the other makes less sense. A conservation change mechanism needs a strategic partner to be adopted, and vice versa. Having a set of conservation change mechanisms at different levels, to address local threats, as well as root causes and policy issues at higher levels, is a prerequisite for a successful programme, particularly where conservation problems are also caused by national and global trade, policy and market dynamics.
- The next two principles are most relevant during the *implementation and adaptation phase* of the programme: an appealing model and a strong conservation and development coalition. An appealing model will result from the above three SPs, being the 'proof' of the conservation change mechanism developed with a strategic conservation partner for 'outside' audiences. In addition, to embed WWF's work in ongoing conservation efforts, there is a need to collaborate with 'natural' conservation partners as well as other development-oriented partners from the public sector and civil society. WWF's work with non-conservation organisations will be more difficult if WWF is the only conservation organisation supporting it, and capacity building of public and civil society partners is critical for long-term progress, to help mobilise other strategic partners from the private sector and to phase out WWF in the long term.
- The last two principles are most relevant during the *share phases* of the programme: widespread adoption and exit strategy. Widespread adoption is essential to move from models to conservation impacts at ecoregional or global level. The programme will make no sense without a good exit strategy as the results will not be sustained and further expanded. An exit strategy makes no sense without widespread adoption, as it would simply imply that results are limited to a limited amount of isolated models.

Apart from the relations between SPs within these three clusters, the clusters are logically linked, as one moves from a successful design of the programme, towards the realisation of concrete results during implementation (for which a good design is obviously one condition), towards wide-spread adoption and a successful exit (for which the previous two phases are an obvious condition).

There are, however, possible variations on the above logic. For instance, root causes at the global level may not be a priority to be addressed; a strategic conservation partner may only be involved once the programme is ongoing and has shown some results; an exit strategy cannot be formulated as long as the effectiveness of the strategic partnership is not clear. However, key is that all seven SPs should be considered during the design phase of a WWF programme, even if every one is not being worked out in detail, gaps remain or adjustments will be made at later stages.

Strategic principle	Project and programme management phases				
	1. Define	2. Design	3. Implement	4. Adapt	5. Share
1. <i>Conservation change mechanism</i>	Thorough and broad context analysis required, including threats, root causes, key actors at different levels, policies, as well as opportunities / triggers.	Definition of the overall strategy as based on the vision, including conservation mechanism/s, strategic partner/s, activities at different levels.	Management should assure that strategy is respected on these issues, and WWF and its partners at different levels play their predefined roles.	Reviews to assure application and lessons learned on strategic principles, possibly leading to adjustment of the strategy.	Lessons to be learned on application of the strategic principles shared and applied in other programmes or follow-up phases.
2. <i>Strategic partners</i>					
3. <i>Vertical integration</i>					
4. <i>Appealing model</i>	Inventory of existing models.	Strategy should define what appealing models will be developed, where and when.	Develop the appealing model/s and in doing so meet criteria of a good model.	Success of the model should be evaluated and then feed into wide-spread adoption.	
5. <i>Strong conservation and development coalition</i>	Actor / stakeholder analysis, review of existing capacities and gaps.	Strategy should define coalition partners and WWF role and resources required to establish it and build capacities.	Activities to maintain and strengthen the coalition, build their capacities and, ensure increasing sense of ownership.	Capacities to become stronger and role of coalition gradually increased.	
6. <i>Widespread adoption</i>		Strategy shows how conservation impacts are expected by horizontal, vertical, and double-loop adoption.			
7. <i>Exit strategy</i>		Design of exit strategy shows how results are sustained and programme is continued.		Partners and coalition to start implementing exit strategy.	Gradual hand-over of programme activities to partners.

Table 1: Application of strategic principles in WWF Management Cycle Phases

4. Description of Strategic Principles

Strategic principle 1: Conservation Change Mechanism

Definition:

A mechanism to realise conservation objectives with medium-term benefits for one or more key actor(s), combined with an opportunity or ‘trigger’ that provides short-term benefits, embedded in a long term vision shared by multiple actors.⁵ The mechanism should set in place or strengthen a process towards increased sustainability (social, environmental, economic, and/or institutional). Examples of *conservation triggers* can be found at various levels: an environmental disaster, a new law, a new technique, an international sustainability standard, a new product or market, (de)centralisation of resource management, a tax incentive. If there is no (external) opportunity at hand, WWF may create one or build upon the germ of an opportunity.

A good conservation change mechanism meets the following criteria:

- It is based on an opportunity or a trigger that represents an opportunity to generate short-term benefits in relation to a larger conservation problem;
- It has significant potential to bring about positive change in one or more indirect threats, and thus has potential to (indirectly) influence the direct threat;
- It focuses on setting in motion a process towards effective and sustainable solutions (as opposed to tackling symptoms), and often shows a way of ‘doing things differently’;
- It provides an incentive to influence at least one key actor in favour of conservation objectives by generating tangible benefits at the short and/or medium term (what’s in it for them?);
- It may also be situated outside the conservation sector (‘framing beyond the conservation / environment setting’), and will thus help establish new linkages (broaden the horizon), i.e. between conservation and non-conservation sectors / levels where drivers are found.

A good conservation change mechanism is not:

- A ‘wave of opportunity’ or ‘win-win’ option for two parties that only deals with the symptoms of the conservation problem (e.g. a technical fix);
- Low hanging fruit only;
- An approach that is clearly against the rightful interests of a certain key actor;
- An activity that requires over a year of research to be able to demonstrate its value;
- An activity that will only show benefits after many years (no short-term results), especially for actor groups with short time-horizons such as subsistence farmers, politicians and small businesses;
- An activity that requires a lot of financial inputs without the promise of becoming self financing.

⁵ In this document we use the term ‘actors’ as being all the players that have direct or indirect influence on the conservation problem, while stakeholders are only the ‘primary actors’, i.e. those with an immediate interest and relation with the conservation problem. Thus, actors are found at different levels, while stakeholders are mainly found at local level.

Guidelines:

1. Make a strategic analysis of the conservation problem, which provides insight in drivers, root causes and associated key actors, at multiple levels (local to global) and within multiple sectors. Key actors often operate from outside the 'target area' and/or at higher levels with major power / influence; they are in the first place 'part of the problem' but also potentially 'part of the solution'. Local communities are also key actors, but may not necessarily be the ones with the power to achieve more nature conservation.
2. Within this web of interrelated drivers and key actors, identify suitable opportunities, which constitute a trigger, entry point, or window of opportunity to generate short-term benefits; this will normally require good insights in the interests and options of key actors and what can influence their behaviour.
3. The opportunity is taken up by WWF and carried forward as part of a 'conservation change mechanism' that generates medium-term benefits and conservation results embedded in a long-term vision shared by multiple actors. The conservation change mechanism sets an example, which, if adopted more widely, brings about major conservation benefits.

Remarks:

4. The conservation change mechanism thus joins three important elements: shared vision, also with non-conservation entities; delivery of conservation results contributing to this vision; and the use of momentum / windows of opportunity to bring about behaviour change that is required for improved ecosystem management. These 'events' that form the kick-off of 'doing things differently' are referred to as 'conservation triggers' in this document, while the longer term process that follows is referred to as 'conservation change mechanism'.
5. A suitable conservation trigger (and thus the potential to develop a conservation change mechanism) may not be available for every problem or threat in a given program area at one point in time, but may emerge during program implementation; thus it is important to be prepared, have sharp senses and scouting capacities ('intelligence watch', or early warning).
6. There are different ways of identifying opportunities / triggers:
 - Keep a close eye on key actors and their options and motivations to change their behaviour;
 - Use the conservation coalition as part of a broader system of 'intelligence watch';
 - Make an actor spider web diagram, or power diagram, to understand who may influence who;
 - Organise a workshop with frontrunners from the sector/s that constitute major threats to conservation, and collect innovative initiatives and best practices.

Good examples of conservation change mechanisms are provided in the Kafue Flats, Living Rivers, and WAMER cases.

Strategic principle 2: Strategic Conservation Partners

Definition:

An actor or group of actors that exerts major direct or indirect influence on a conservation area or problem, and that through (a change in) its behaviour can contribute to realise conservation goals, by itself or by influencing other key actors.

A good strategic conservation partner is:

- It shares the long-term vision with WWF as regards a (sector) specific conservation problem;
- An influential player (existing network or association), that is or can become part of the solution, either by itself or by influencing other actors in the sector based on their own interests (thus leading to mainstreaming within the sector);
- Often from a private sector that constitutes a (current or future) major direct threat (or associated with an indirect threat) to conservation, or from the public sector, depending upon the amount of actual control of the state over the economy in general and natural resources in particular;
- Willing to take responsibilities ('ownership') and to contribute with one's own resources;
- Willing to sign a formal and long-term (but not eternal) relationship with WWF (e.g. by contract);
- Reliable, transparent and accountable (not corrupt or (secretly) involved in illegal activities); even if the partner has been (or remains) part of the problem;
- The partner may reflect or even require exclusivity, especially when 'branded' private companies are involved.

A good strategic conservation partner is not:

- A network or association that has been put in place as part of the programme;
- An organisation that just provides (strategic) funding to WWF, without scope for up scaling;
- An organisation that just receives support by WWF without putting in own resources;
- A partnership that uses WWF's name to obtain a green image without changing its practice;
- An actor with a doubtful track-record or still involved in illegal procedures;
- An actor that leaves the bulk of the work / responsibilities to WWF;
- A partner that is not supported by the wider conservation coalition.

Guidelines:

1. Identify root causes and drivers for change at local and higher levels. Subsequently, identify current or potential opportunities or threats to the main actors behind the root causes. Determine power, market and policy relations between actors, and assess which actors would be most open to discuss a role in the conservation change mechanism.
2. Identify suitable strategic conservation partners as being influential and/or innovative individuals, groups, or organisations. As most threats and underlying factors are posed by economic or political interests, such partners are often found in non-conservation sectors. By focusing upon Government partners, it appears from the case studies that opportunities are often missed of engaging powerful private sector actors who can influence the market or create new markets.
3. In identifying conservation partners, it is crucial to make a good assessment of what doors can be opened via the potential conservation partner, and which ones may

- remain closed. A good strategic conservation partner does not exclude WWF from engaging others.
4. Assure that potential strategic partners are committed and have the potential to take over the initiative or influence others within the sector to join, or to reach new scales, sectors, or political levels. Thus, they can bring about positive change based on their own interests, or through changed behaviour, by adopting the conservation change mechanism.
 5. Ideally, the strategic conservation partner is a powerful actor who, by his interests in adopting or supporting the conservation change mechanism, can significantly influence other actors in the sector (thus leading to mainstreaming within the sector). However, in other cases there are no powerful players willing to change, and one may start out by identifying less influential actors or innovators, who may influence others on the basis of demonstrated benefits – this is normally a longer process.
 6. There will be late adopters and rejecters in any sector or in any region. While working with innovators, it is necessary to consider how these need to be dealt with, also to keep the strategic partner on board (e.g. through lobby for government regulation, support to campaigning NGOs, or additional dialogue led by WWF and its conservation partners).

Remarks

7. It is possible that strategic conservation partners will surface only after (some period of) conflict (usually they surface after media campaigns or court cases; the campaign or court case can actually become the conservation trigger).
8. Beside strategic partners as defined above, other types of partnerships may be distinguished (terminology may vary between different organisations):
 - Natural partners from the conservation sector, possibly including local communities, NGOs and CBOs, international NGOs, etc.;
 - Funding partners (donors, World Bank, other funding agencies);
 - Development partners (with related socio-economic development objectives not contradictory to conservation goals);
 - Government partners or private sector partners that are not strategic partners (because they will not be able to have a significant contribution to the conservation vision / goal).

Good examples of strategic conservation partners are provided in the Kafue Flats, Living Rivers, and Forest Conversion Initiative cases.

Strategic principle 3: Vertical integration

Definition:

A coordinated set of programme activities at different spatial levels, at least including local and national (policy) levels, to address interrelated direct threats and indirect threats (root causes) in a consistent manner.

Good vertical integration should meet the following criteria:

- It involves at least two levels: field / local level and national level;
- It includes activities at an international / global level if priority threats or root causes are found at this level; this may imply that outside the local stakeholders targeted by the conservation programme, activities are undertaken to influence actors, markets or policies at a local or national level; e.g. by mobilising German consumers or UK timber traders;
- Activities at different levels are undertaken simultaneously and hence require (international) coordination;
- Well defined coordination and communication responsibilities; vertical integration requires interaction on strategic and operational levels between WWF NOs / POs and often a redefinition of the relationship, which in many cases was program donor and executor respectively;
- Influencing public and corporate policies is considered as a crosscutting issue that can be addressed at different spatial levels (as opposed to a separate thematic field).

Good vertical integration is not:

- Ad-hoc established linkages between existing WWF projects at different levels;
- Activities at different levels with a strong dominance at one level;
- Activities at global level or in consumer markets that do not address priority threats or root causes as associated with the conservation problem that the programme is addressing;
- A WWF policy desk-undertaking advocacy and lobby activities in isolation from other programme activities.

Guidelines:

1. Realising vertical integration first of all requires a strategic analysis of threats, underlying factors and key actors at different levels, and ways of addressing the key ones (see SP 1);
2. Usually, the need to undertake activities simultaneously at different levels transpires when it is evident that there are key drivers at different levels, so that the conservation problem cannot be solved at a single level. One example is trying to preserve coral reefs without working internationally to fight climate change. Similarly, it makes little sense to work on CITES if lobby activities are not firmly rooted with work to protect trade in species at the local or regional level.
3. Where possible, link up with (or make use of) existing projects, networks or influences within WWF and beyond (e.g. global policy network);
4. The activities at different levels may have different funding, but there is a need to define responsibilities for coordination of the set of activities at different levels (coordination North –South and within WWF).

Good examples of vertical integration are provided in the FSC and Colombia Chocó-Darién cases.

Strategic principle 4: Appealing model

Definition:

An example of the Conservation Change Mechanism applied in practice, which demonstrates good practice and concrete benefits, and which is sufficiently attractive to be widely adopted by others.

An appealing model should meet the following criteria:

- It can be communicated, and is as much as possible visible and tangible ('Seeing is believing');
- It can be found at different levels, in line with the principle of establishing conservation change mechanisms at different levels (vertical integration);
- It is not limited to a physical field model (e.g. a sustainable farming technique), it can be a less tangible or visible result such as a legal reform, a standard, a land-use plan, a policy, a new product or market (field, policy or market models);
- It demonstrates the expected benefits for key actors, in an easy and/or attractive way, it motivates others to adopt, upscale and spread the model, yet it is sufficiently flexible to be adapted to other contexts;
- It can be explained and propagated by a (strategic) partner within its own sector or constituency.

A model is not appealing when:

- It does not represent a perspective of tackling a larger conservation problem;
- It does not raise interest with key actors;
- It cannot be easily observed, communicated or is not supported by good communication;
- It takes too long to show results;
- It is one in which only WWF has invested (100% WWF ownership);

Guidelines:

1. An appealing model aims to demonstrate how a conservation change mechanism (as based on a conservation trigger) can generate benefits that will motivate key actors to adopt, adapt, upscale and spread the model - so that conservation impacts will be realised ('conservation mechanism in action');
2. It is important to 'open up' the limited scope of a 'model' of being field based and of physical nature (see above);
3. A model may be situated at any level, from local, national to global;
4. A good communication strategy should ensure that the model – once it has proven to work - reaches the expected actor groups (see also chapter 5).

Remarks

5. Programs can have several modules that in their totality form part of the overall conservation strategy, with every module being responsible for developing an appealing model of a different nature (e.g. field-based, market-based and policy-oriented). Together, these will form an appealing model of how the strategy can be implemented.

Good examples of appealing models are provided in the Kafue Flats and WAMER cases.

Strategic principle 5: Strong Conservation and Development Coalition

Definition:

A formal or informal alliance of conservation and development organisations aimed at developing a strong network and countervailing power against non-conservation interests, through optimising synergy and through focused capacity building.

A good conservation and development coalition should meet the following criteria:

- It brings together relevant stakeholders from public sector and civil society with common interests in realising the conservation and development vision;
- It has an open attitude of sharing of information and mutual respect;
- It is motivated to improve capacities, increase responsibilities and accept ownership;
- It has well defined mutual and shared responsibilities leading to optimal complementarity of knowledge, capacities / expertise (e.g. good cop - bad cop) and available resources and strengthening of the collective bargaining position;
- It coordinates strategies, activities and avoids duplication;
- There is joint external communication and lobby where appropriate;
- It ensures that (sometimes exclusive) WWF strategic partnerships (see SP2) are embedded in an inclusive network with conservation partners (otherwise WWF risks to isolate itself from its 'roots').

A good conservation coalition will not be achieved if:

- There is a fundamental difference in understanding of the problems and solution strategies;
- WWF and other NGOs structurally speak different languages (science based versus political);
- There is no space for pragmatism;
- There is no trust between the coalition members;
- Members don't act according to commitments made in the coalition;
- There is no willingness to invest time to improve capacity;
- Partners in the coalition come out in the public arena with their own positions/views without consulting or informing the coalition;
- One organisation claims 'ownership' of the entire conservation- and development field.

Guidelines:

1. Develop insight in the main conservation and development interests of the main stakeholders (Government, civil society and private sector), and then define overlapping and conflicting interests (e.g. through a matrix or other type of interest map).
2. Give an overview of ongoing projects and programmes and funding of potential partners working on the main conservation problem, or on issues associated with the main conservation problem, as a basis to identify the key stakeholders to be involved in the coalition.
3. Assure with potential coalition partners that they share common grounds ('vision') with WWF on environmental, conservation, community and sustainable development issues (as compared to key actors and potential strategic partners, often linked to threats or drivers of destruction).
4. Within the conservation and development coalition, define different roles of the various partners (at local, national and international levels); in doing so apply the underlying principle of complementarity of each other's roles and expertise.

5. For the coalition, clearly define its common objectives; these should be specific in order to avoid the coalition to become a 'talkshop'; there should be direction of working towards increasing ownership and a role of the coalition in realising the ecoregional or programme's vision.
6. International NGO's may be expected to take the lead in establishing a conservation and development coalition; WWF may be requested to play a leadership role in establishing and maintaining the coalition.
7. Capacity building should be based on felt needs and on capacities required for the coalition to play its role in realising the programme vision, helping to enable widespread adoption and take ownership in programme follow-up activities.
8. Assure activities to maintain and nurture the coalition or platform, with transparency and open communication as guiding principles (regular meetings, communication channels, regular information exchange), and assure a clear focus on the common objectives mentioned above.

Remarks:

9. Where there are important external conservation threats, building strategic partnerships with key actors often requires a certain level of pressure on the potential strategic partner or on the sector as a whole. A conservation coalition can be instrumental to do so, and would imply the need to maintain (or develop) good relations with other conservation and development NGOs (WWF's 'natural partners') and with relevant governmental agencies.
10. Where there are no important external threats, building up a strong coalition is also critical, to assure that all stakeholders move in a desirable direction, take ownership and collaborate.

Good examples of conservation and development coalitions are provided in the LIFE-Namibia and TAL-Nepal cases.

Strategic principle 6: Widespread adoption*Definition:*

Adoption of a successful conservation change mechanism by third parties (strategic conservation partners), to realise conservation impacts on a scale that cannot be achieved with WWF's resources only. There are three types of widespread adoption:

- Horizontal, i.e. elsewhere in the same ecoregion, or from one ecoregion to another
- Vertical, i.e. from local to national or national to regional / international level, or vice-versa (up scaling or downscaling)
- Transversal or multi-loop, i.e. to other sectors, commodities, policy fields, etc.

Good 'wide-spread adoption' should meet the following criteria:

- It is the result of an 'autonomous' reaction by strategic conservation partners; WWF may be involved in communication (i.e. of an appealing model, SP3), but not in physical or financial support (of adopting field, policy or market-based activities);
- It is supported, facilitated or at least approved by the conservation and development coalition;
- It must gradually lead from 'dots' to major conservation impacts in line with the programme vision (more bang for a buck);
- It includes a certain degree of adaptation to different, specific conditions in the 'target' areas (no blue print replication).

Good 'wide-spread adoption' is not:

- Realised by including more strategic conservation partners in WWF's programme;
- Replication without reaching greater scales and significant conservation impacts;
- Promoting or implementing 'blueprints' of local solutions in other areas;
- Adoption of corporate or public policies without actual impact on conservation;
- Limited to field projects.

Guidelines:

1. Widespread adoption basically results from the successful application of SP 1 (conservation change mechanism), SP2 (strategic conservation partner) and SP3 (vertical integration). However, during programme implementation, efforts should be targeted at assuring that widespread adoption is really being done.
2. While in some cases widespread adoption is being done by Government agencies, in most cases the private sector should also be involved. Here, widespread adoption can take place by a powerful key actor, or through adoption by followers and wait-and-see people (of the appealing models developed by frontrunners).
3. Wide-spread adoption may require voluntary (industry code of conduct) or mandatory (legislation) standards introduced for a sector or country (often private sector partners insist on development of such 'level playing field' measures to prevent the 'free riders' symptom).
4. WWF should be particularly involved in looking for opportunities to realise horizontal, vertical, and double-loop widespread adoption, and play a proactive role in showing strategic partners that such potentials exist and together work on realising these.

Remarks:

5. There appears to be a trade-off between widespread adoption in terms of the quantity and the quality of the realised impacts: wide-spread adoption may reach large areas or a major proportion of the sector but the intensity of the improvements is limited, while in other cases the intensity of improvement is great but the rate of adoption less impressive. WWF should be aware that such differences exist and try to design what type of widespread adoption is most desirable.

Good examples of widespread adoption are provided in the LIFE-Namibia (horizontal), Forest Conversion initiative (vertical), and FSC (transversal) cases.

Strategic principle 7: Exit strategy

Definition:

A strategic pull-out of the programme by WWF, as a logical consequence of the key actors' strong interests to continue and sustain the programme by their own resources.

A good exit strategy should meet the following criteria:

- It is an analysis of the required WWF presence after the end of the programme funding period;
- There is clear communication of WWF's commitment to the programme on short, medium and long term, stressing the commitment of WWF to long term ownership by key actors;
- It is generally embedded in programme activities to build up capacities among coalition partners and other actors involved in continuation of the programme;
- It generally presupposes that conservation change mechanisms have reached a certain level of self-financing and self-reliance;
- There is a secured minimum level of funding, preferably by a diversity of donors and funding sources.

A good exit strategy is not:

- The result of downscaling of the program;
- Abruptly pulling out of a project;
- Continuing to fund a successful project, for instance because it enables fundraising;
- Pulling out of a program that is not well embedded institutionally and for which local management capacities are not sufficient.

Guidelines:

1. An exit strategy should ensure that the project will not remain dependent on WWF support. A successful exit strategy is largely a logical consequence of application of all previous principles, e.g. strategic partners are willing to take over the project.
2. An exit strategy is one element of a successful conservation strategy, aimed at sustaining the project results and guaranteeing continuity. Yet, a good exit strategy should be designed at early stages of formulating a programme strategy.
3. Especially in large conservation programmes, the possibilities and mechanisms for pull-out may only become clear after a number of years of (successful) implementation. The exit strategy may therefore need revision as based on achievements during the programme.
4. Note that within a large-scale program, it is most realistic to assume that separate programme modules are gradually handed over and not the whole program at once (e.g. regulation of water resources for hydropower generation with Zesco in Zambia). Thus, each programme module may have its own exit strategy.
5. When WWF leaves the implementation of field or lobby activities to other organisations or (strategic) partners from the onset, the exit strategy will focus on reducing funding and capacity building.

Good examples of exit strategies are provided in the FSC and TAL-Nepal cases.

5. Conditions for successful application of strategic principles

Summary of findings

The case study descriptions (in Chapter 6) show how the selected programmes have applied the seven strategic principles, and for each of the nine case study descriptions the findings are summarised in the overview table below. Note that application of strategic principles has often been done in an implicit way. It can be observed that indeed all the selected programmes have applied most of the strategic principles. This is evidence of the strong linkages between strategic principles. The following matrix also indicates which application of certain strategic principles by a selected programme constitutes an excellent example.

Case studies	Strategic principles								
	1. mechanism	2. partner	3. vertical	4. model	5. coalition	6. Wide-spread adoption			7. Exit
						Horiz.	Vertical	Double	
Kafue flats	++	++	-	+	0	0	+	-	+
West Africa marine	++	0	0	++	+	+	0	-	+
LIFE - Namibia	+	-	-	+	++	++	+	+	0
FSC / MSC	+	+	++	++	+	+	0	++	++
FCI – palm oil	+	++	+	+	+	+	++	++	+
TAL - Himalayas	0	+	0	+	++	+	0	-	++
South West Amazon	+	0	0	+	+	+	0	-	-
Colombia Chocó-Darién	+	+	+	+	++	+	0	-	0
Living Rivers	++	++	+	+	0	++	+	+	0

++ = Excellent example to demonstrate this strategic principle
 + = Good score on application of the strategic principle
 0 = Moderate score on application of the strategic principle
 - = No or very limited application of this strategic principle

It can be observed that two selected programmes (FSC and FCI) score ‘good’ on all the strategic principles. Among the seven strategic principles, vertical integration appears to be least developed. This may be explained by the fact that linkages with global root causes and key actors are sometimes insufficiently analysed or difficult to establish, implement, and coordinate in a (field-based) programme. Exit strategies also score relatively poorly, as many programmes are still starting up implementation and have not yet considered phase-out yet.

WWF is well aware of the fact that application of the seven strategic principles is not a simple task: it requires effort, attention, human skills, time, and resources. The assumption is that these investments will pay back by improved effectiveness and impacts of the programme operations.

Conditions for successful application of strategic principles

Apart from very general conditions for successful programmes, such as sufficient financial and human resources, the case studies have demonstrated that successful application of the seven strategic principles requires some specific conditions. At least five conditions have emerged, as follows.

1. Flexibility in terms of planning, input of financial and human resources. There are several arguments why large-scale programmes require flexible planning and funding mechanisms, and thus require flexible accounting and planning procedures. Firstly, large-scale programmes are complex and face several challenges that have a high level of unpredictability. Secondly, stakeholders and forces are being influenced that may respond unpredictably. Thirdly, opportunities may emerge or disappear at certain moments, requiring rapid responses or adjustments of planned activities. Lastly, different programme modules may be implemented at different moments, awaiting the right moment (window of opportunity or conservation change trigger).
2. Strong leadership. Again, there are several arguments why large-scale programmes require excellent leadership. In order to achieve major conservation impacts, strong vested interests opposing the proposed changes have to be overcome. Secondly, the programme will need to deal with a range of different stakeholders and interest groups, which requires good negotiation skills. Leadership must assure that the programme remains oriented at progress towards realising the overall vision and strategy while respecting the essence of the strategic principles.
3. Good coordination mechanisms. Large-scale programmes have different components that operate at different levels (vertical integration). This poses special requirements to coordination. Vertically integrated projects also require more frequent and different forms of contact between 'Northern' and 'Southern' WWF offices. In some cases, current WWF governance and decision making structures have hampered north-south or cross-boundary cooperation.
4. Communication strategy. Good communication is the backbone of complex programmes. This refers to internal communication, as well as external communication towards the public, policy makers, and private sector actors that one wants to influence. A communication strategy is required from the onset, with human and financial resources made available to execute the strategy. Special attention is required for communication within the conservation and development coalition, as well as communication between WWF and its strategic conservation partners. Adequate ICT resources are a prerequisite for good communication.
5. Interpersonal skills and open-mindedness. Staff involved in programmes working with these strategic principles must be experts on their field of expertise, but must also be open-minded and willing to look over their 'expert fence'. This is important when working in multi-disciplinary teams. More importantly, successful implementation of the strategic principles often entails a paradigm shift, e.g. from tackling threats to realising opportunities, or from confrontation of enemies to partnerships with powerful stakeholders, or from WWF taking the lead to WWF empowering a coalition of partners. Staff should be sufficiently open-minded to see and accept such paradigm shifts if these are helpful to realise the conservation vision.

6. Case study descriptions

1 Integrated Water Resource Management Project, Kafue Flats, Zambia

Introduction

The construction and operation of the Kafue Gorge and Itezhi-tezhi dams in Zambia in 1971 and 1978 have adversely affected wetlands and livelihoods in the Kafue Flats. As part of the Kafue Flats project, which was implemented between 2000 and 2007, a tripartite partnership of WWF, the Ministry of Energy and Water Development (MEWD) in Zambia and Zambia Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO) was established to mitigate these negative effects by improving water management in the Kafue Flats.



The project aimed to restore the natural flooding regime through the development of new operating rules for the two dams to allow for the release of environmental flows in the flats. With the help of DHV Consultants, a Decision Support System (DSS) was developed where a rainfall model was linked to a hydraulic model, which enables the water management institutions to simulate and forecast flooding.

The project was part of the larger Partners for Wetlands Programme, which aimed to engage private sector stakeholders in wetland conservation and restoration globally, with other field projects in Brazil, China, Malaysia and Ukraine.

The Kafue projects targets were officially reached with the official launch of the new operating regime at Itezhi-tezhi on 28 May 2004. However, after the launch, it took until the end of 2006 before the new operating rules could be applied. This was due to little rainfall in the wet season, the need for further fine tuning and improvement (e.g. calibration) of the simulation models and training of engineers at ZESCO and MEWD. During the wet season of 2006/2007, the new operating rules were applied for the first time. This has resulted in the release of an additional water release ('freshet') into the Kafue flats, which is synchronised with the real flooding and thus mimics natural flooding. In the past, this flooding was off timing.

It is believed that the new operating rules will make a substantial difference to the natural environment in the flats, benefiting wildlife as well as local people's livelihoods through providing more and better areas for cattle grazing and improved fisheries. The results of the new operating regime will be carefully monitored over the next years, both through field studies and remote sensing techniques.

The project had a modular approach, with modules or sub-projects addressing the main actors or economic interests in the Flats; large-scale agriculture (sugar), tourism, hydropower and community livestock raising, and fisheries. From the onset, it was

clear that water regulation by the dams was the key driver for the environmental disequilibria in the flats. While working on a way to engage ZESCO, the project initially focused on developing partnerships in the agricultural and tourism sectors. However, once ZESCO was engaged, the focus of attention shifted toward improving water management as the key driver of change in the Kafue basin.



Itezhi-tezhi Dam in Kafue river
Photo: © WWF / Frans Schepers

1. Conservation Change Mechanism

- Mimicking natural flood patterns increases livestock and fisheries productivity and restores biological diversity without threatening power supply,
- Natural flooding and sustainable use of the Kafue wetlands was promoted as a better option for food security instead of draining it for large-scale agriculture. Generating support for changes in the water management regime through information exchange with local communities led to a community supported alternative for large scale irrigated agriculture plans promoted by the World Bank
- By creating a tri-partite agreement, there was a formal linkage and mechanism between the key stakeholders, and a Steering Committee was formed with all the stakeholders involved.
- Although ZESCO is a para estatal, it is still dependent on the MEWD and National Water Management Board to comply with the Zambian Water Act and obtain so-called water permits for their operations. This formal relationship and the strong involvement of the MEWD in the project ensured that ZESCO remained committed. In the early stages, WWF mostly approached ZESCO through this formal line of the Ministry. Later, working relationships were more directly as well.

The Conservation Change Trigger

The release of a DHV study demonstrating that a more natural flooding regime would not endanger power supply, and the fact that DHV had been involved previously in water management issues in the Kafue Flats. DHV and ZESCO had a very good relationship on the technical level (engineers to engineers) which opened doors and which created a base for a good partnership relation.

By lobbying, the project formally became a pilot under the newly established Water Resources Action Plan (WRAP) of the Government of Zambia. This gave buy-in from the government from the outset.

Zambia was one of the frontrunners on sustainable water management issues, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002.

ZESCO was, after 30 years of using old dam operating rules, ready for a more environmental approach and recognized the disadvantages and negative impacts of the rules used so far. For ZESCO this provided an opportunity to address almost yearly complaints that have been made on untimely flooding of local community fields and villages, through the employment of water and environment experts.

2. Strategic conservation partners

- ZESCO, as operator of the dams, was the key partner for this project. ZESCO is the major power supplier to the country, as it provides 50-60% of Zambia's electricity, and exports electricity to countries like South Africa.
- The Department of Water Affairs (part of the Ministry of Energy and Water Development) was a second key partner because of its statutory responsibility of the implementation and enforcement of the Zambia Water Act.
- The Zambia Water Development Board, a formal government body where different government agencies are represented, turned out to be a key partner because of its advisory role to the Ministry of Energy and Water Development.
- A Steering Committee was established for the implementation and guidance of the project, to make sure that the different stakeholders were well involved and informed of the progress.
- The project established formal partnerships (MoUs, agreements) with the key stakeholders. The most important one is the tri-partite agreement between WWF, ZESCO and MEWD.

3. Vertical integration

The project never addressed this key principle, as it became only apparent in later stages. However, the following four issues are important in this respect:

The Steering Committee for the Kafue Flats project has become the National Steering Committee for Zambia, as part of the Zambezi River Commission. This means that the project has a formal link to the entire Zambezi Basin⁶.

⁶ It is interesting to note, however, that Zambia has not signed the Zambezi River Basin protocol yet

Through the WWF Dams Initiative, the project has become well known and has served as an example at several international conferences on river management, dams and environmental flows.

Based on the collaboration in this project, WWF Netherlands and DHV consultants have established a formal partnership on water infrastructure projects worldwide. In addition, WWF Netherlands has commissioned a study to identify other existing dams where similar approaches could be applied.

4. Appealing model

The environmental flows project, as part of the Kafue Flats project has been mentioned as the highest profile example globally of WWF seeking to restore flows. Even though the situation of the Kafue Flats is rather unique (a huge wetland between a storage and a power generation dam), the approach of involving stakeholders has ample potential for replication.

As mentioned above, the project was an official pilot under the Water Resources Action Plan (WRAP) of the Government of Zambia. The link that the project has made with food security issues and the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper had made it even more effective. The proximity of the Kafue Gorge dam to Lusaka also makes it an easy site to visit.

5. Maintaining a conservation coalition

Particularly local community relations are essential here; initially neglected in the project but taken up in the Dialogue Project starting in 2003. The Dialogue has had very little direct influence on the design and implementation of the environmental flows project in the Kafue Flats, but formed nevertheless a crucial factor in the success of the overall project in the later stages. Communities were disappointed however, when the first additional water release ('freshet') did not materialize until 2006.

6. Wide spread adoption

Although the situation of the dams upstream and downstream of the flats is peculiar and rather unique, the approach followed by WWF is exemplary, and the biggest success story in large-dam related water regime changes. As these regime changes have to be tailor made to address local physical circumstances and decision-making structures, it will take years before water regime changes are effectuated at other dam sites.

As a main part of the next phase of the project (2007-2009), actions and interventions will be developed to influence management of water resources at national level and Zambezi river basin level, using tools like meetings, professional publications, and demonstrations such as simulation of the model performance, field visits, and regular updates to the target audience. As the project is a pilot project under the Water Resources Action Programme (WRAP), being implemented by the Ministry of Energy and Water Development, it will contribute to the improvement of the management of water resources (surface and groundwater) throughout Zambia.

Magnification within the region will be mainly through the National Steering Committee of the Zambezi River Commission, to influence water managers in the riparian countries, for the opportunity to learn and adapt the new decision making tool. Communication activities will include presentations, distribution of materials like

brochures and posters to participants at the annual regional meeting and, funds allowing, field visits by representatives from riparian countries.

Concrete adoption possibilities for changing operating rules are the Kariba Dam (Zambia/Zimbabwe) and the Cohora Bassa Dam (Mozambique). This should take place through the key stakeholders (dam operating institutions) themselves; WWF should only facilitate and actively promote. However, the future will learn if this will be feasible and if these key stakeholders will grab this opportunity.

7. Exit strategy

The project was set up with a clear exit strategy: once the conservation change mechanism with a strategic partner would be materialized and adopted by the key stakeholders, a gradual phase out of WWF would take place.

This is the situation at present: ZESCO and MEWD have fully adopted the new operating rules and have taken the lead their application. WWF's role is changing. Apart from continuing to be a member in the Steering Committee, the focus of WWF will be on monitoring of operation rules and impacts of the new flooding regime (together with a number of monitoring partners), and magnification of the project to the wider Zambezi basin and elsewhere in the world. WWF is gradually phasing out, and its role is changing towards monitoring and promotion of similar initiatives elsewhere in the basin through IRBM approaches. An opportunity has arisen to upscale the Kafue experience to the Zambezi Basin in conjunction with the Zambezi Water Course Commission. In this way, a successful exit strategy that encompasses the national (Zambia) and regional (SADC Water) actors is expected to be possible.

Some other critical factors are important for WWF to gradually phase-out:

- the legal base that was recently provided to the new operation rules through the water permit under the Zambia Water Act, given out by MEWD to ZESCO, creates a strong sustainability to the results achieved;
- ZESCO and MEWD have internalised the new water management system as their business practice;
- strong and intensive cooperation during the years of project implementation has built trust between WWF and the key partners;
- partners have started to work together on an impact monitoring programme, which will show the impact of the project on the ground, in terms of benefits for people and nature.

Strategic Principle	Applied?	Strengths	Comments
1. Conservation Change Mechanism	Yes	Flood regime restoration proved possible without economic loss	Monitoring programme should have been part of the project design from the onset
2. Strategic Conservation Partners	Yes	ZESCO and state water agencies were successfully mobilized	Earlier engagement of public agencies could have speeded up ZESCO engagement
3. Vertical integration	No		Links to (inter) national policy arena's on dams and water regulation could have been explored at an earlier stage
4. Appealing model	Yes	Project was designed to produce appealing models from the onset; project is considered global best practice on environmental flows within WWF; the applied stakeholder process is widely applicable	The Kafue flats hydro-geographical situation is unique and cannot be replicated easily
5. Conservation and development coalition	Eventually	Linkage of water resource management with food security created community commitment to changing flood patterns	Expectations were not properly managed and the project was distrusted until substantial investment was made in community dialogue
6. Widespread adoption	Not yet	The approach and process are well documented and ready to be applied in Zambia through WRAP and elsewhere in the region	the Kafue Flats water regime is peculiar and a more 'standard' dam situation should be considered as future model
7. Exit strategy	Yes	Legal base, implementation, monitoring and governance structures are in place to enable strategic partners to take over. This will effectively happen as of 1 July 2007	

II West Africa Marine Ecoregion (WAMER)

Introduction

The Western African Marine Ecoregion (WAMER) includes the coasts and waters of 6 countries: Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea. The region is characterized by up-welling of deep nutrient rich waters, stretching for more than 2,150 kilometres along the coastline, which support a rich biodiversity, one of the most important fishing zones in the world and an important wintering area for birds. As the single most important source of foreign exchange in the region, these fisheries are a key source of revenue and social development. In the whole ecoregion, fisheries generate more than US\$ 800 million annually, and the jobs of some 600,000 people (only in Senegal) depend directly on fishing and fisheries related industries.



Over the past decades, pressures on coastal ecosystems and fish stocks have continued to rise, resulting in significant losses of key habitats and over fishing by both local and foreign fleets. The over fishing and depletion of marine resources off the coast of West Africa is the result of activities at the global, regional, national and local levels.

Locally, the increased pressure of domestic fishery fleets searching for fewer and fewer fish, leads to the use of destructive, habitat-destroying fishing techniques like the use of dynamite, bottom trawling and beach seining.

Regionally, competition between the countries for 'favourable' fisheries agreements, weak national policies and 'improvements' in fishing gear that increase fishing efficiency, puts further pressure on fish stocks. The importance of fisheries both domestic and international for the national economies, confronts governments with the dilemma of responding to both development needs of their population and ensuring the integrity of their natural resources upon which people depend for food and income. Fisheries agreements with the EU are not based on sustainability criteria (either ecological or social). Market forces and unfair subsidies for the EU fleet distort international markets and favour large-scale fishing operations over community-based fishing activities. Important other future threats include oil exploration in the region and tourism activities.

The WWF WAMER program began in 2000 as a response to these threats, and consisted of 4 modules (the new programme has merged modules 1 and 2 into one). This case study focuses upon the first three of them:

1. Sustainable artisan fisheries;
2. Supporting and creating marine protected areas;
3. Fisheries agreements;
4. Conservation and sustainable use of marine turtles in the Western Africa Marine Eco-region.



Imraguen fisherman with yellow mullet catch
Photo: © WWF-Canon/Mark Edwards

1. Conservation change mechanism

The first module is on sustainable artisan fisheries and aims to achieve that traditional fishermen of WAMER region adopt methods and practices of sustainable fishing. The opportunity for this module was the existence of a fisheries council and initiatives to regulate fishing in Cayar, one of the most important fisher villages in Senegal. WWF has provided this community with technical advice, funding support, training and capacity building, particularly in the field of fishing laws and regulations, and started up a micro-credit facility to be used for local investments in value-adding activities. For instance, local agreements state that boats are allowed to go fishing only once a day, and catch per boat was limited. While many conflicts existed and rules were not adhered to initially, presently an estimated 95% of the fishermen adhere to the rules as a result of the program. The size of the fish has also increased. The fish price has increased as well so there is real economic benefit for the people (win-win situation).

The second module is on the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the region, and is closely linked to the previous module as the design of MPAs is a process initiated by local communities interested in sustainable fisheries. MPAs offer a range of benefits for fisheries, local economies and the marine environment. They can provide a safe haven for fish stocks to recover, alternative sources of income for local people, prevention of habitat damage, maintenance of biodiversity, and much more. MPAs act as an insurance policy for the future, both for marine life and local people. Here, the opportunity is the fact that in Senegal both government and community expressed great interest in establishing MPAs as based on experiences in other countries. WAMER also promoted a change in Senegalese legislation, which now permits communities to set up their own MPAs. A major achievement has been the gazettement of 4 MPAs in Senegal (960 km²). Other activities included training of management personnel and local communities to help them realize the management objectives for their MPAs, helping them to draft and implement management plans, and promote co-management between government and communities.

The third module, at the regional level, is on the establishment of fisheries agreements between countries and the EU, in view of attaining targets for negotiations. To do so, WWF has drafted fishery agreement models for Senegal and Cape Verde. By working with government, local NGOs, Fishers' Associations, and the Sub-regional Fisheries Commission (CSRP), WAMER helps countries to agree on minimum terms and conditions for access by foreign fleets. One could state that the trigger for this initiative was the fact that countries in the region have to sign new agreements with the EU once every 5 years and have become aware of the importance to negotiate good terms. While the results of these negotiations have been rather positive in Cape Verde, the negotiations failed in Mauritania (because of a shift of government), and are still ongoing for Senegal (which as at least stopped the EU fisheries activities in Senegalese waters since July 2006).

WAMER claims that these modules result in winners at all levels:

- at the local level, the livelihoods of fishermen and their families are protected as improved management methods are adopted;
- at the national level, governments are better able to safeguard their nations' valuable marine assets while at the regional level, governments of the sub-region will be able to negotiate more sustainable and profitable fisheries agreements;
- at the regional/global level, better fisheries management in WAMER will guarantee a perpetual source of fish for fishers from other parts of the world.

This seems somewhat simplistic. Losers may include the national industrial fishing fleets (losing their autonomy or being more strongly regulated) and the short-term interests of most of the above stakeholders. Note, however, that national industrial fleets do not represent a great threat to fisheries.

2. Strategic conservation partners

In the new WAMER project proposal under the heading of 'magnification partners', a range of stakeholders is listed, including community organisations, NGOs, national governments, research institutes, and the sub-regional fisheries commission. Reference is made to the fact that these actors will carry the programme activities further and help implementation elsewhere. However, this does not fit well with the definition of strategic conservation partners, as they do neither contribute with their own resources, nor do they represent influential stakeholders with non-conservation interests.

The Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) can be considered as a strategic conservation partner. It is a ministerial level institution representing all 6 WAMER countries, plus Sierra Leone, and has a very broad mandate but lacks enforcement authority. This entity plays an important role in widespread adoption of models within member countries, although it is stated to be 'handicapped by political divergence between member states'.

Other options for strategic conservation partnerships in the non-conservation sector would have been representatives of industrial fisher fleets, financial institutions funding the fishing fleets, marketing boards (if existent), etc. In addition, the new 5-year plan has noted opportunities to develop strategic conservation partnerships with key actors representing future threats, i.e. in the oil sector and tourism.

3. Vertical integration

The programme recognizes four levels where it operates:

- Locally, using community based initiatives to protect biodiversity and improve livelihoods;
- Nationally, to support improved legislation and assist in negotiating agreements with the EU and establishment of MPAs;
- Regionally, to promote better coordination between WAMER countries for shared interests;
- Globally, to lobby the EU for adoption of environmental standards for sustainable fisheries.

The first three levels are part of the WAMER programme and are well coordinated by the WAMER head office in Dakar, with good information exchange and frequent meetings. At the global level, the three networks of WWF, IUCN and Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) have lobbying offices in Brussels, and they will start a more concerted lobby to include sustainability issues in the EU fishing agreements. However, this level has just recently got off the ground and it is admitted that information exchange and coordination with this level may be improved. At this level, there may also be additional opportunities for developing 'sustainable' fish products, and early steps would need to be taken if poor coastal states are not to miss the boat for access to European and US markets in future.

4. Appealing model

The Cayar example of community based fisheries management is acknowledged as a good model of how communities can work closely with governments to reduce poverty and protect biodiversity. The model includes setting maximum catches, minimum acceptable prices and strict rules for access, is locally run and sustainable. Credit unions reduce poverty and have allowed people to use micro-credit funds to start vegetable farming, livestock, shop keeping, and to add value to fish products by initiating their own wholesale fish businesses instead of selling to middlemen. The community has decided only to permit loans that promote activities, which are respectful of the environment, reduce poverty, and promote development. The MPA located in the Cayar fisher community also constituted a model for others to adopt. WAMER has facilitated the establishment of new marine protected areas in Guinea (1), Senegal (4) and Cape Verde (2). The Senegalese MPAs were recognized as a Gift to the Earth in 2005, covering nearly 1,000 square kilometres. The models resulting from modules 1 and 2 are jointly considered as a good model as they are strongly related.

As regards to module 3, WAMER established relations with Fisheries Departments in all countries of the ecoregion and with the SRFC – see under SP 2. This allowed technical support in negotiations of new access agreements with the EU. The results have been successful for Cape Verde, including more money for producer countries, closed seasons, and no-fishing zones being installed. The agreement that was developed in Cape Verde has been used as a model agreement for other countries to adopt. Negotiations have failed in Mauritania (due to a change of Government) and are ongoing in Senegal. There are also contacts with East Africa (EAME and Madagascar) to spread the model agreement.

5. Conservation and development coalition

At the regional level, WWF WAMER has played an important role in setting up a coalition with IUCN, Wetlands International and the International Fund for Banc d'Arguin (FIBA). This resulted in the establishment of a Regional Programme for Marine and Coastal Conservation in West Africa (PRCM). WAMER brings the marine programmes of the 4 founding NGOs together with some 60 partner institutions from the ecoregion: NGOs, research institutions, regional institutions, international bodies and donors. The strength of PRCM lies in its diversity and flexibility. Each organisation has a different but complementary role to play in alleviating poverty in small coastal communities. Major objectives are decided together and each institution is encouraged to contribute its unique skills, experiences, and mandates. Every 18 months, PRCM organizes a Regional Forum for stocktaking and future planning.

Largely as a result of this coalition, WWF WAMER has good relations and is highly appreciated by its various partners. The fact that WWF WAMER was invited by the CSR Ministers Conference in Cape Verde to discuss the potential oil threats for the region shows its recognition as an important partner.

6. Wide spread adoption

In terms of horizontal adoption, the aim is to popularise the Cayar model for artisan fisheries management across the ecoregion. To do so, a radio programme has been set up for awareness raising in local communities and training, and a film has been made to disseminate the model internationally. Interest has been shown from the side of other fisher villages to introduce the Cayar fish management system, and the successful micro-credit system has been copied to the fisher village of Popenguine. There has also been a very successful fisheries campaign supported by the President. Fishermen from the Banc d'Arguin have visited Cayar to exchange experiences. However, it is too early to say whether this will be successful, mainly because it is unclear to what extent the village of Cayar is representative. In the mean time, conditions for successful application of this example have been improved due to WAMER activities to establish new laws for improved fisheries management and progress in co-management of fisheries resources in various countries.

WAMER spearheaded an analysis of the most important coastal areas within the ecoregion and as a result, several new MPAs have been created in different countries. One of PRCM's first priorities is the establishment of a network of marine protected areas covering the main habitats of the coastal zone. The success of the project will be used by IDEE-Casamance (an IUCN affiliate) in the southern part of Senegal. Fishing communities from West Africa (Ghana, Togo and Nigeria) will take part in exchange programmes to learn about sustainable fisheries and improve the quality and sustainability benefits of management. Thus, the PRCM conservation coalition is instrumental to spread the good example of Cayar to other areas and countries. As a result of WWF technical advice, Senegal and Cape Verde have improved their fisheries access agreements with the European Union (e.g. more money, closed seasons, no-fishing zones), and adoption by other countries is envisaged. There are also initiatives to adopt the same approach to the fisheries sector in Eastern Africa.

In terms of vertical integration, there are some interesting developments. At the regional level, there is currently an EU funded programme to help strengthen the SRFC so it can take its rightful place at the centre of regional fisheries management. The countries of the ecoregion share migratory and cross-border fish stocks yet negotiate with the EU individually - each country promoting its short-term national priorities with little regard for the overall impact on stocks or neighbours. This is understandable

since each country has its unique perspective. However, if shared stocks are not managed at the regional level, the whole ecoregion will suffer. Here the SRFC can play a pivotal role.

At the same time, the unsustainable EU policies and regulations will be addressed by FOE Netherlands. Local fishermen can be supported in their efforts to improve their livelihoods by strong North–South partnerships, working to establish more sustainable fisheries and create opportunities in the product chain to market quality standards.

7. Exit strategy

The new WAMER project proposal gives specific attention to an exit strategy (while the evaluation report says nothing about it). The WAMER exit strategy is based on the assumption that if projects are implemented by local institutions and with local stakeholders, they will reap the benefits, will be more likely to work for sustainability, and will gain necessary experience. The success of this approach can be seen in Cayar where fishers who benefit economically and socially from improved fisheries, new management techniques are working hard to perpetuate the management system. Similarly, communities that see benefits of MPAs and have the right experience and legal support will want to keep them working. This is why projects include elements of information sharing, capacity building, and policy.

The aim is to make MPAs self-sufficient by putting in place proper financial mechanisms and working through local institutions. This will involve some level of cost sharing between communities and national governments of which the details remain to be worked out by the stakeholders as part of the management planning process envisaged for each MPA. MPA Conservators (Managers) are civil servants whose salaries and basic operating costs are covered by the Ministry.

At the regional level, a phasing out is more difficult to envisage and considerable support by WWF will remain necessary for some time to come. At the same time, however, there is a lot of additional (non-WWF) financial support for the project, e.g. Dutch Embassy, World Bank, GTZ.

While strengthening community-level and regional collaboration will bring clear benefits, long-term sustainability depends on promoting a dynamic coalition between NGOs that represent fishers and other fishing-related actors (women fish workers, sellers, etc.) and their governments. Currently, most of these NGOs are too weak to provide a credible counter-balancing voice. This is why WAMER has chosen to work with NGOs in each country to strengthen their structures and operations. OXFAM-NOVIB has generously provided funds to this effort through 2008.

Strategic Principle	Applied?	Strengths	Comments
1. Conservation change mechanism	Yes	Existing organisation in Cayar fisher village was an opportunity to develop local sustainable fisheries. Establishment of MPAs was based on government interest to do so. Improved agreements of member countries with the EU were based on increased Govt. awareness.	The threats by industrial fishing fleets are not directly addressed (but this threat is claimed to be less priority than local unsustainable fisheries)
2. Strategic conservation partners	Partly	Here the sub-regional inter-ministerial fisheries commission may be considered as a strategic partner.	Other stakeholders are claimed to be 'magnification partners' but do not fit the definition. There would have been scope to identify other strategic partners.
3. Vertical integration	Partly	There are strong linkages between activities at local, national, and regional level, through the central WAMER office and the PRCM. At global level activities by WWF Brussels have started.	Activities at Brussels level are not yet well coordinated / integrated within WAMER.
4. Appealing model	Yes	There is an appealing model at local level (Cayar village) of sustainable fisheries and a functional MPA. A successful fisheries agreement of Cape Verde with the EU serves as another model.	
5. Conservation and development coalition	Yes	WWF has played a crucial role in setting up a strong regional conservation coalition (PRCM) which has much contributed to success of the programme.	
6. Widespread adoption	Partly	At horizontal level, there is evidence of adoption of the 'Cayar' model. There is interest to adopt the WAMER approach in East Africa At vertical level there is interest among government actors to improve conditions for adopting sustainable fisheries.	
7. Exit strategy	Yes	Received attention in recent project proposal. An exit strategy exists for the local level, but at regional level, WWF support will be required.	

III Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) project in Namibia

Introduction

The communities targeted by the LIFE program are located outside the protected areas on communal lands in Namibia. Although dispersed in the country, their locations are largely concentrated in the northeastern and northwestern parts of the country. These areas are rich in biodiversity and had remnant populations of wildlife when the project commenced. However, the communities are relatively poor, and several of them had few other options left than to exploit the natural resource base, i.e. by poaching, agriculture, and livestock farming. Livestock, in particular, are a threat to wildlife, as livestock competes with wildlife for grazing and habitat. The Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) program strives for recovery of the wildlife populations outside the protected areas, by providing alternative sources of income to the local communities (as their livelihoods constitute the major threat). A critical component in the evolution and development of the LIFE programme was the use of earlier experiences from Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Zambia in developing its approach.




The LIFE program commenced in 1993 as a foundation-building period for the National Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) Program and in subsequent years accomplished the following achievements:

- contributions to major CBNRM policy legislative reform;
- creating awareness of CBN development opportunities for communal residents;
- community members mobilized and organised into conservancies;
- progress towards realising significant incomes and benefits to community participants;
- significantly increase CBNRM support capacity for Namibian organisations.

Phase II commenced in 1999 and placed emphasis on assisting conservancies to become effective and self-sustaining managers of their natural resources, on developing income-generating activities to conservancies with a longer-term objective of becoming self-financing, and developing support systems at enhancing management and monitoring capabilities of conservancies.

The LIFE Plus Project assists the CBNRM Program and conservancies to consolidate current natural resource management efforts and integrate new resource management responsibilities into conservancy management plans as the evolving policy and legal basis allow.



Migration of elephants in Namibian desert
Photo: © WWF / Anne van Gelder

1. Conservation change mechanism

The main conservation trigger was the 1996 Amendment to the 1975 Nature Conservation Ordinance, which provides the legal basis for conservancies. The Amendment devolves ownership rights to communal conservancies over the four most common game species (kudu, oryx, springbok, and warthog) found in Namibia, and devolves rights to use and benefit from all other species. A need remains, however, to fully devolve rights to “protected” and “specially protected” game species. This Amendment has some history. In the mid 1980s an anti-poaching program was developed, which provided an early template for community-based conservation. It won the trust of traditional leaders in the Kunene region, who agreed to appoint local people as community game guards and work with local NGOs to promote an increased sense of stewardship over wildlife. Meanwhile, Namibia’s Nature Conservation Department (now the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, or MET) had devolved wildlife user rights to white-owned freehold farms. Private farm-owners were allowed to sustainably utilise animals for game meat, trophy hunting, and tourism. Following independence, these two models formed the basis of government action to extend the same kinds of

use rights that farm-owners had enjoyed to those who lived on communal lands. The Nature Conservation Act of 1996 enabled the establishment of conservancies - legally gazetted areas within the state's communal lands - through Namibia's CBNRM Program.

With support of the LIFE program and other WWF investments, the communities' response to the acquisition of rights over wildlife has been reflected by wildlife husbanding efforts that have reversed downward population trends and precipitated unprecedented wildlife recoveries across northern communal areas. Economic benefits obtained by conservancies include:

- Cash income to the conservancy;
- Employment income to conservancy and community members; and
- In-kind benefits (i.e., meat, training, game donations, etc.) that may be derived as a result of conservancy development and management activities.

Revenues from game utilization will see a major increase in 2006. A large proportion of this increase is being received by some of the poorest communities in Namibia.

Given the impressive results obtained so far, it is hypothesised that similar responsible management may be provided if rights to other resources are also devolved to conservancies. Such devolution of rights would allow communities to establish a single committee to manage multiple natural resource assets, thereby reducing the confusion and high cost of creating and maintaining a committee for each resource. Achievement of second generation conservancies and effective integrated resource management approaches can be initiated by harmonizing wildlife, tourism, fishery, and forestry management strategies to work through conservancies.

The LIFE Plus Consortium is helping program partners to build upon the present tourism and wildlife-driven enterprises, while concomitantly expanding the range and variety of income-generating enterprises that thus far have been untapped, such as conservation farming, wood product sales, fresh water fisheries and natural plant products. However, to do so there is need to further improve the legal conditions for the communities. One example is the tourism and investment policies for communal areas, which would be strengthened significantly if conservancies were provided legal authority to sublet tourism land leases directly to private sector partners and to better enforce access to land and other natural resources from competing users. Another example is the recently passed Fresh Water Fisheries Act, which recognizes the need for community involvement in the management of fishery resources, but does not specify conservancies as a recognized management body. The pending regulations may provide an opportunity, but proactive inputs by the conservancies and national CBNRM Program are required. LIFE coordinates closely with its partners to facilitate constructive dialogue and inputs towards harmonization of relevant legislation and policies.

Thus, based on the trigger of national legal changes, local communities have changed their livelihood from natural resource exploitation to a range of income and livelihood options that are being derived from service industries (i.e., photo tourism, trophy hunting, live game sales, camp sites, handicrafts production, guide services, etc.) that are driven by sustainable use and management of the natural resources base. This addresses the main driver (poverty) that threatened conservation. The new situation also offers opportunities and benefits for the Government (by stabilising local communities and providing them satisfactory incomes on a sustainable basis) and private sector agencies (by being involved in income-generating enterprises such as lodges and wildlife hunting).

2. Strategic conservation partners

LIFE activities are implemented by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), conservancies, and other involved Namibian institutions. WWF coordinates with a consortium of partners to assist Namibian CBNRM support organisations, and does so under the guidance of the MET and the Namibia Association of CBNRM Support Organisations (NACSO). NACSO is composed of 12 member NGOs (and the University) and represents and coordinates the CBNRM agencies who provide services to conservancies. Thus, WWF supports NACSO in their activities to support conservancies, establish good joint ventures, establish contacts with lodges and tourism companies, etc. Therefore, there will be less institutional problems with an exit strategy.

The partnership between WWF and NACSO cannot be fully referred to as a strategic conservation partnership (according to SP 2 definition) as NACSO is neither from a non-conservation sector, nor a private or public sector agency. WWF and its NGO partners basically have common interests, thus these are WWF's 'natural partners'.

There are various close relations between WWF and private sector companies, although these are not formal partnerships. These include relations with game farms, the Namibia Hunting association, and the Namibia Tourism Association. For instance, support is being provided to partner organisations to ensure that lodge development opportunities are maximized. In addition, WWF has been facilitating an arrangement with a private game farm owner and a lodge company about placing a lodge, from which a portion of the income would be used to support NACSO's operational costs.

In addition, strategic alliances have been formed with other projects (e.g. ICEMA and SPAN projects) and funding agencies and this has unlocked extra resources and synergy.

3. Vertical integration

The LIFE program operates at local level (NGO support) and at national level (policy lobby), as well as in some instances at regional level (trans-boundary issues involving Botswana and Zambia). At the global level, so far activities have been rather limited to marketing campaigns and CITES discussions. There is recognition that addressing global level drivers may increase effectiveness and impacts of the programme. For instance, one driver to conservation threats in Namibia is the EU policy which favours meat imports from Namibia (and other countries), thus stimulating extensive livestock keeping in competition with wildlife. The LIFE project currently looks into possibilities of lobbying at EU level to stop this favourable mechanism. Apparently, the global driver was not so important; otherwise the LIFE program would not have reached its current level of success. However, this global driver may be more relevant for the southern part of Namibia.

4. Appealing model

The appealing model for others to copy and replicate were the first functioning conservancies. The model was based on an approach of empowering local communities with rights to sustainably manage and benefit from their natural resources. The model cannot be seen in isolation from the legal and policy changes that were stimulated by LIFE. A business approach has been used to facilitate partnerships between private sector and conservancies to apply and tap into market forces. Conservancies have become autonomous local institutions, targeted for capacity building with an aim of conservancies to become financially self-supportive. By 2004, five of the longest-running conservancies were financially self-sufficient; by

2006, twelve conservancies had reached the point of covering their full operational costs.

There has been a Parliamentary visit to conservancy tourism activities, which is an example of how the model can help motivate other key actors (in this case in defining adequate policies). Further, there have been international visits to observe the conservancy program from a range of countries including: South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, and most recently, Cambodia.

5. Conservation and development coalition

The main direct partners of WWF were the NGOs and the local communities, as well as indirectly the Government agencies (MET and others) and private companies and users in the tourism and wildlife hunting sector. Assistance was provided to the MET and CBNRM Programme partners to build awareness and capacity in other ministries to support conservancies.

NACSO provides a critical coordination, planning, and management role for the NGO service organisations that are implementing supportive CBNRM activities to conservancies and/or other target entities. During the reporting period continued support was provided to NACSO and its members in the forms of grant funding and technical support.

WWF-LIFE staff operate through the three National CBNRM working groups (institutional support, business and enterprise, and natural resource management), which clearly shows WWF's commitment to share responsibilities and maintain a strong conservation coalition. These groups have developed conservancy-training materials that promote increased accountability, improved governance, better financial management, better planning, enhanced natural resource management / monitoring systems, and effective business development and management practices. The outstanding example is the development of the management orientated monitoring (MOMs) system. Without LIFE this would not have been developed.

6. Wide spread adoption

The number of conservancies had increased to 50 by the end of 2006. The 50 conservancies cover 118,704 km² and contain more than 210,000 citizens of the country. This is equivalent to 14% of the land surface and 11.6% of the Namibian population. An estimated 20 more conservancies are still under development.

Projected benefits are anticipated to increase from N\$20,099,173 for calendar year 2005 to more than N\$25,000,000 for 2006. This would be an increase of approximately 25%. Employment generated for local communities amounted to 542 people full-time and 2,933 people part-time employed. Studies in two of the most advanced conservancies (Torra and Nyae Nyae) found that conservancy derived benefits improve rural livelihoods by 26% and 45%, respectively, suggesting that conservancies can have impacts on rural poverty.

There are striking impacts of the LIFE program on wildlife. Populations of elephant, zebra, oryx, and springbok have increased several-fold in many conservancies as poaching and illegal hunting has dropped. Northwest Namibia now boasts the world's largest free-roaming population of black rhino, while game in the large Nyae Nyae Conservancy has increased six-fold since 1995. In Caprivi's eastern floodplains,

seasonal migrations of game between Botswana and Namibia have resumed for the first time since the early 1970s.

The rapid expansion of conservancies can be traced to a combination of factors. Government leadership, as evidenced by its willingness to devolve wildlife use rights to communities, has inspired immense enthusiasm for communities to form conservancies. However, an equally crucial factor was a strong commitment from NACSO and its NGO members, who provided the bulk of on-the-ground support to the conservancy movement.

Widespread adoption has thus taken place mainly in horizontal respect:

- Spreading to more and more conservancies in Namibia, and reaching substantial numbers and proportions within the country, in terms of numbers and economic impacts;
- Replication to other countries (Mozambique, Malawi, possibly Zambia, and South Africa).

The Event Book Monitoring approach has been introduced and adapted to meet local conditions in Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique, while Cambodia is now using the system in a pilot monitoring effort in one of its national parks. The Namibia model appears to be more viable than similar experiences in other countries (CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe and ADMADE in Zambia). WWF also supports initiatives to expand the Namibia experience across the borders into the Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, with Peace Parks as a suitable partner organisation.

7. Exit strategy

Three issues are raising concerns for sustainability of the program. The first is that the ad hoc manner in which some conservancies distribute their benefits does not always favour the poorest households. The second is that limited participation in conservancies is hampering genuine local governance and empowerment. A deeper, more structural problem is the limited nature of local rights with conservancy residents denied full property or tenure rights. Despite periodic discussion of land reform, ownership of all communal lands is retained by the government, in a holdover from colonial times.

Regarding an exit strategy, there are two issues. The first is whether there is an exit strategy in place for LIFE. However, the existing LIFE vision is said to be jeopardised by premature and unplanned cuts in donor funding. The second set of issues concern the challenges that the conservancy programme is facing or will soon face. These include governance issues at local level, the need to raise revenues so that they substantially exceed operating costs and create further incentives for the management of wildlife, the relative viability of wildlife and other land-use (such as livestock), the government's rural resettlement policy, and the overwhelming challenge of maintaining skills and capacity within conservancies. As a result, the National CBNRM Programme will eventually be confronted with major funding shortages, as closure of LIFE Plus funding will closely coincide with closure of other funding sources. Hence, there is an imperative need to look at other sources of internal funding to allow the National CBNRM Programme to maintain key services to conservancies. This was intensively explored recently. A number of options were identified, such as establishment of a CBNRM Conservation Trust and a tourism agent conservation levy payment to build business-generated incomes into this Trust from tourism agent fees.

Strategic Principle	Applied?	Strengths	Comments
1. Conservation change mechanism	Yes	Built on new policy that gives partial ownership of wildlife to local communities. Benefits for communities are substantial and have changed their livelihood systems towards more sustainable activities.	Other policy fields are being lobbied to develop more appropriate and supportive policies (e.g. tourism and fisheries)
2. Strategic conservation partners	No	No formal partnerships. WWF works with private sector as a broker to link private sector with conservancies. WWF has also set standards for transparent tender approaches and good contracts to adhere to.	This indirect way of working with private sector agencies could merit more attention.
3. Vertical integration	No	Activities at local and national levels. Since there are no important global threats and drivers in the region where LIFE first operated, a global activity was not necessary. LIFE did tap into global tourism markets, as the majority of income is being generated from foreign tourists.	Currently the EU is being lobbied to stop its policy that favours meat from Namibia.
4. Appealing model	Yes	The first conservancies have become self-supportive, and this constitutes a powerful model to a sustainable and viable livelihood system. This result should be seen in conjunction with legal and policy changes.	
5. Conservation and development coalition	Yes	WWF has good relations with its natural partners in Namibia, other projects and government actors in the sector and beyond. There is a donor coordination mechanism for the CBNRM sector.	
6. Widespread adoption	Yes	All three types of adoption are ongoing and have allowed major conservation impacts to be reached. WWF has been strongly supporting expansion to other countries	The question is whether in other countries policy conditions are sufficiently favourable to adopt this conservation change mechanism.
7. Exit strategy	Partly	A key element of the exit strategy was to make conservancies self-financing, which has been achieved for more than 12 conservancies. Processes and options are being designed to reduce the dependency of the NACSO Association on external funding. Capacity building is an important component to adequately support the service provision structure.	The programme has expanded more rapidly than expected, which leads to other challenges in terms of an exit strategy for the service provision structure, than had been foreseen.

IV Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)


Introduction

For some years, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) stand as independent organisations but the WWF Network stood at the basis of their foundation and growth. Both FSC and MSC aim to harness consumer purchasing power to generate change and promote environmentally responsible stewardship of two key heavily exploited natural resources: timber and fish respectively. They do so primarily through standard setting and accreditation of certification bodies, which in turn assess and certify producers and companies along the trade chain, if, and when, they meet the standards for responsible production and a reliable chain-of-custody.

The WWF Network has played a vital role in the creation and promotion of both FSC and MSC, whereby the former served as a model for the latter. Through the years, WWF support has been offered under many different campaigns, programs, names and partnerships. At present, FSC support activities fall under the WWF Global Forest Programme, whereas MSC is brought under the WWF Global Marine Programme. The Network's contribution to these certification schemes includes financial support, lobby and advocacy, technical support and research, marketing and promotion.

1. Conservation change mechanism

The FSC process resulted from rising global concern over the loss of tropical forests and associated media campaigns organised by a range of NGOs, including WWF, in the 1980s. These campaigns raised public and policy makers' awareness of forest destruction in wood consumer countries and discussions about what timber from sustainable sources should be. In response to this, the timber trade started to issue 'certificates of sustainability' to consumers, which claimed that their timber supply originated from well managed forests. In the early 1990s, research by WWF UK and others, showed that by far most of these green claims intentionally mislead consumers into buying (tropical) timber. One exception to this intent was the US-based Rainforest Alliance, who had systematically audited and certified a number of forests areas. They realised, however, that its commitment to sustainable forestry had as much credibility to consumers as other certificates because the criteria applied were ultimately the Alliance's own, and there was no third party overseeing its certification decisions. The foundations for the FSC were laid during a first meeting of a group of timber users, traders and representatives of environmental and human-rights organisations, including Rainforest Alliance and WWF, in California. This led to a broad and global consultative process in 1991 and 1992, which was funded by WWF, and which aimed to develop the draft principles and criteria for what was later to become the FSC, the accreditation body for forest and forest product certifiers. With the establishment of the FSC, an instrument came into existence, which offered a short and medium-term perspective to companies in the forestry sector to have their operations audited and certified. By doing so, consumers would have a tool, a logo, by which to determine which forest products are from well-managed sources. FSC was founded as a membership based organisation in 1993, and its systems became fully operational in 1996 and attracted participation from a wide range of social, community and indigenous peoples groups as well as responsible corporations, development aid agencies and other public organisations.



The symbol of the FSC is spray-painted onto stacks of processed timber in Amazonas State, Brazil.
Photo: © WWF-Canon / Edward Parker

As of January 2007, FSC has 663 members, around 84 million hectares of forest in 76 countries has been certified under FSC, and 5,400 (stand alone) Chain of Custody certificates were issued in 74 countries. Relative to the total exploitable forest area in the world (approximately 3%), FSC is still a small player but it is having a significant strategic impact on the forestry, timber and paper industries.

MSC was legally founded in 1997. It originated not so much from broad public outrage over over-fishing and false market claims, but instead from Unilever's CEO Anthony Burgmans who, a year earlier, had expressed interest to collaborate with WWF to address the sustainability issue in the fisheries sector through a certification system similar to FSC. Unilever, one of Europe's largest frozen fish product companies, wished to assure that it would not be publicly associated with illegal and over-fishing, and to contribute to the realisation of a tangible solution to these problems. MSC initially struggled with a perceived exclusiveness for some time, but has been able to

make the business case in the past few years. Over 50 fisheries are now engaged in the MSC process, representing over three million tonnes of seafood. The MSC has now brought together a broad coalition of supporters from over 100 organisations in more than 20 countries. Since its founding, the MSC has managed to bring 4% of the world's edible wild fish under its programme.

2. Strategic conservation partners

Within the FSC process, many different companies have played and continue to play a role as strategic partners but most credit for the initial stages should probably go to B&Q in the United Kingdom (now Kingfisher/B&Q) for taking the lead in the Do-It-Yourself (DIY) sector in supporting and promoting FSC, and taking direct action to assure that its commitment to introduce FSC wood products in its stores would be realised. B&Q was also a lead member in the WWF 1995+ Group, which brought together timber retailers and traders committed to realise their target. As described above, the MSC process emerged from a Unilever–WWF Netherlands initiative in 1996. As a result, 40% of Iglo's fish products (Iglo is a former Unilever subsidiary) is now MSC certified.

Both B&Q and Unilever played a key role in making the FSC respectively MSC system work for their own business practises as well as in inviting and challenging other companies (competitors and companies up or lower in the trade chain). In many instances, the WWF Network has provided technical, strategic, or other support to its partners in their efforts to engage other actors.

3. Appealing model

Once FSC became operational in 1994, some of the forests previously certified by now accredited certifiers became FSC-recognized operations. To some extent, these certifications served as an immediate model of FSC's functionality. At the same time, the certified forests had weak linkages to mainstream timber trade and as such did not suffice. In the initial years, WWF Sweden worked very hard to develop the first national FSC standard and assisted Stora in obtaining its FSC-certificate for its large forest holdings, which were already important suppliers of softwood to the West European DIY and housing construction markets. The Swedish model triggered many other producers to follow suit, but the most complicated was to identify a workable model in the tropics that both respected remaining reservations among many NGOs about certification of large-scale logging operations and that would be capable of supplying the market. The FSC-certification of 80,000 ha of natural tropical forest in Brazil in 1996 (Precious Woods Amazon) was a crucial success that was achieved primarily by a visionary elite from Switzerland and a single tropical timber specialist in the Netherlands, A. van den Berg BV, a company that had transformed from an opponent to NGO campaigns into the strongest supporter of FSC and the NGO agenda.

However, both in the FSC and the MSC process, a single model would not suffice to win the hearts and minds of potential fore-runners, and other stakeholders required that model FSC certifications take off in different countries, different forest types, for different products and along different steps in the trade chain. The WWF Network supported such activities with technical advice and funding.

Some of these model projects have controversial elements in them. For example, the FSC certification of the Baramas Timber Company in Guyana raised eyebrows, as this is the subsidiary of a logging company with a notorious reputation in Sarawak, Malaysia. WWF provided technical assistance in the process leading up to SGS certification, which was recently withdrawn by FSC due to major non-compliances with

FSC Principles & Criteria. Similarly, MSC-certified Hoki fisheries in New Zealand cause by-catch of seals and birds; an issue that is apparently hard to address but also ecologically not too harmful as seal populations are thriving. It is, however, a major reputation risk for WWF to endorse such fishery practices. The MSC certification is at present subject to a complaints procedure, but mostly because the fisheries involved did not prove continual improvement. Failed model projects are nevertheless not necessarily a bad thing. They provide learning opportunities and represent the reality that WWF too is merely a stakeholder in the process, and not in control of the certifications. It also allows WWF to take a critical stance if deemed necessary, which would be harder if WWF was leading or governing the initiative.

4. Maintaining a conservation coalition

Formal and informal partnership collaboration between WWF and other NGOs has proven to be a crucial factor in the successful growth of FSC and MSC. The conditions for such partnership depend very much on the national socio-political context and preferences of individuals within various organisations. In the Netherlands, Ghana and Brazil, for example, Friends of the Earth is considerably more pragmatic than its counterparts in Malaysia, Indonesia or other Latin American countries. Where the need for pragmatism is recognized and credible to these NGOs supporters collaboration has resulted in powerful results. FSC Netherlands, one of the strongest GFTN members, was built primarily by merging groups of companies mobilized by Friends of the Earth Netherlands and Novib-Oxfam with a group brought together by WWF NL. Similarly, Greenpeace has been a synergetic partner for WWF within the FSC membership and Board, but the organisation has an undecided position in relation to MSC.

Of course, WWF has been an important financial backer of FSC in its initial years, but sought to reduce its financial commitments from 1998 onwards. FSC was able to find other funding sources, while the WWF Network continued to (financially) support FSC-related initiatives such as the GFTN, certification processes, and marketing. MSC has similar experiences with WWF; it has benefited most from WWF support for making certifications possible, either by technical inputs or financial support.

5. Vertical integration

WWF's answer to the need to work in an integrated manner if supply and demand are to meet (which is crucial for any certification scheme to function), is the Global Forest and Trade Network (GFTN) for the forestry sector. By facilitating trade links between companies committed to achieving and supporting responsible forestry, the GFTN creates market conditions that help conserve the world's forests while providing economic and social benefits for the businesses and people that depend on them. An initiative such as GFTN does not exist in the fisheries sector. WWF has been instrumental in promoting MSC, e.g. through the 2006 WWF Netherlands Responsible Fish campaign, which neatly linked up with MSC's launch of the first certified herring in May 2006.

6. Wide spread adoption

WWF has put much effort into assuring that FSC and MSC are widely adopted. Clearly, the initial stages of FSC and MSC revealed both the need for such promotion as well as its limitations. Creating demand without available supply has also been a frustrating experience for many. Both FSC and MSC have made the business case for their schemes but much work remains to be done to make certification attractive in regions and trade chains where the business case for illegal practices and overexploitation remains at least as competitive. Similarly, both FSC and MSC realise that their

schemes cannot and should not out-compete small-scale producers (community forestry and artisan fisheries). For example, small-scale fishers comprise approximately 94% of the world's fishers and produce nearly half of the global fish supply for human consumption. To help develop sustainable practice for small producers where needed, WWF developed a methodology for community-based certification (CBC) to help introduce the FSC and MSC standards to local fishers and forest communities that depend on fishing, timber and non-timber forest products for their livelihoods. WWF also established a small grants fund to help community fisheries with MSC certification.

WWF has stimulated FSC–MSC interaction and exchange of experiences by organizing a meeting between WWF staff working with the two organisations in 1999. FSC and MSC also interact independently, and staff is moving from one organisation to the other.

In response to its success, FSC has seen the emergence of competing schemes (PEFC, MTCC, CSA etc.). There is some ground to believe that FSC's leadership in forest certification also promotes continual improvement of these other schemes, which for some time challenged WWF to also consider the possible validity of schemes other than the one it helped to found. For this purpose, WWF and World Bank Alliance have jointly developed the Forest Certification Assessment Guide (FCAG), which sets international standards that need to be met by certification schemes.

7. Exit strategy

WWF's role in the foundation and development of both FSC and MSC is widely acknowledged. With both organisations functioning independently, it is important for WWF to let go at the right time and also to give credit to the organisations' achievements independent from WWF's (former) contributions in external communications.

In relation to FSC, WWF has applied some exit strategies such as through reducing financial contributions and by considering and developing the FCAG. Towards MSC, no explicit exit strategy is in place and although the foundations are being laid, there is less coordinated effort to promote the scheme through market linking such as done by GFTN.

In FSC and MSC, all strategic principles have been applied and to some extent, one could argue that these principles also emerged from experiences with these two certification schemes. Now that both systems are operational and their business case has been made, WWF is challenged to (further) design its exit strategies which are unlikely to result in complete withdrawal but instead force the Network the continuously consider what is the best approach for WWF, the schemes and the sustainability challenge.

Strategic principle	Applied?	Strengths	Comments
1. Conservation change mechanism	Yes	FSC and MSC certification offers tangible solutions to the chain of trade and consumer actors to act on widespread concerns over global forest loss and over-fishing.	
2. Strategic conservation partners	Yes	WWF has been instrumental in bringing stakeholder groups together both for FSC and MSC, notably big private sector players in the sector (B&Q, Unilever).	Because of its initiation by a narrower group of stakeholders, MSC has struggled to build a broader support base in its first years. It has been difficult to engage mainstream actors from the Global South but the trend in recent years is positive for both FSC and MSC.
3. Appealing model	Yes	A range of certification pilots in different countries and ecosystem types have been supported by WWF to variable degree. Funding has also been made available for pilots/models undertaken by other NGOs.	The nature of the trade commands that a single model will not suffice. It is thus necessary to invest in a large number of pilots. MSC would like WWF to play a more active role in linking demand and supply.
4. Conservation coalition	Yes	In many countries and regions, WWF has worked with other NGOs, local communities and other networks in pursuit of the promotion of FSC but less so in fisheries.	Compared to FSC, fewer NGOs are involved in the MSC process. WWF and MSC documentation provide little information about coalitions in MSC work.
5. Vertical integration	Yes	WWF's support to FSC (through Forests for Life, Global Forest Programme, WWF – World Bank Alliance and GFTN) has been tremendously comprehensive. The Global Marine Programme has a similarly broad scope (conservation, management, policies and consumption).	Because of a strong WWF NL promotion campaign in 2006, MSC is now struggling to handle the growth in demand for its services. There is not yet a GFTN-equivalent initiative for fisheries.
6. Widespread adoption	Yes	FSC, yes. By the sector but also to the extent that various competing certification schemes have been developed, challenging WWF to also consider the quality of these systems. MSC: less so but the support base is growing. WWF has stimulated FSC – MSC interaction and exchange of experiences.	Widespread adoption in the MSC process is partly the result of more limited investment of WWF's resources in the process.
7. Exit strategy	Yes, for FSC	Direct financial support from the WWF Network to the FSC institution was drastically reduced and more recently, the WWF – WB Alliance has set the conditions for possible recognition of other, non-FSC forestry standards.	There is no WWF exit strategy for MSC. The recent departure of key WWF representative in MSC Stakeholders Council and Board has left a gap in WWF expertise in the sector and MSC process.

V The Global Forest Conversion Initiative

Introduction

In 1997, WWF Netherlands raised € 250,000 to conduct studies on the causes of large-scale forest fires in Indonesia. The resulting report identified some of the market actors that were driving the expansion of the palm oil boom, such as Unilever and financial institutions. When this report reached WWF Germany, this office decided in 1998 to start their “No burning for margarine” campaign, which held accountable German companies who used palm oil for margarine and other products. Whereas this campaign yielded limited response from companies in Germany itself, it caught the attention of companies outside the country.



Tesso Nilo, Riau, Sumatra, one of the main palm oil producing regions of Indonesia

In 2000, WWF Switzerland started the “strategic action on palm oil and soy” campaign, to address the increasing threat of palm oil and soybean production posed to tropical forests. One year later, this activity was renamed Forest Conversion Initiative (FCI). It was brought under the umbrella of the WWF Global Forest Programme, which aimed to have a global network of protected areas by 2010, at least 100 million ha of independently certified forests by 2005, and 20 forest landscape restoration initiatives up and running by 2005.

Based on the abovementioned studies and extensive additional research, the FCI identified palm oil as one of the most important threats to tropical forests in Southeast Asia based on the volume of expansion (hundred thousands of hectares annually) and the current land cover in the regions where this expansion occurred (primary and secondary lowland forests). Most palm oil is exported, although Indonesia also has substantial domestic consumption. Europe, India, and China are the most important export destinations. Production is controlled by a small number of mostly Malaysian companies, often with close links to the Malaysian government. Substantial investment is provided by European banks, among which Dutch banks are particularly important.

The FCI works on different scales in soy and palm oil production and consumption regions, and addresses consumers, corporate actors and, to a smaller extent, policy makers. One of the key activities is the development of multi-stakeholder roundtables for responsible (or sustainable) production, aimed at influencing powerful market actors/companies as well as civil society. This case study highlights the application of the strategic principles work of the FCI focused at palm oil, and its second focus on soy.



Oil Palm plantation Tesso Nilo, Riau Province, Sumatra, Indonesia
Photo: © WWF-Germany/M. Radday

1. Conservation Change Mechanism

The trigger that initiated the process was the rampant Indonesian forest fires and regional haze in 1997/98. This event had a massive impact on the regional economy (billions of dollars losses), on people's health (millions of people affected) and on protected forests. WWF's research found that many fires were related to land clearing for the establishment of plantations to meet the growing global demand for cheap pulpwood and palm oil. Associated root causes include the under valuation of high conservation value forests, corruption (allowing plantation concession in protected area buffers, and even inside protected areas) and poor law enforcement (allowing plantation companies to illegally clear land by the use of fire).

Based on this analysis it was decided that in order to curb further deforestation for oil palm, mainstream companies should be addressed. Supporting certification of a 'niche' standard (organic, fair trade) would not reduce conversion by non-certified companies. As palm oil is not a consumer product in western markets, direct consumer action ('buy sustainable palm oil') was also no option. In order to mobilize companies in the palm oil chain to source responsibly and prevent further conversion, a three-pronged strategy was implemented by the FCI, supplemented by activities by other WWF and non-WWF organisations (these will be discussed under SP5: conservation coalition).

'Check your Oil!'; a consumer awareness campaign aimed at young audiences, linking palm oil in candy bars, cosmetics and snacks to deforestation. The campaign called upon consumers to request 'source of vegetable oil' information from consumer information desks of companies like Nestlé, Unilever, and L'Oreal. This resulted in considerable attention for the issue at board level and public affairs managers begging not to expand the campaign beyond Switzerland and Germany.

FCI mobilises palm oil processing industries, food manufacturers, and retailers in Europe, through direct contacts, and business and industry seminars. Through such engagement the companies are informed about impacts and opportunities to improve practice, such as developing sourcing criteria, discussing deforestation issues with suppliers and participation in the global roundtables described below.

The Roundtable on Responsible Palm Oil (RSPO), brings together stakeholders from within the sector, as well as from sectors involved in causing the problem (plantation companies and their financiers, industry associations, processors of palm oil), and those that aim to reduce the impacts of the industry (social and environmental NGOs, labour and indigenous organisations). Together, they seek better understanding of each other's interests and determine a more sustainable development path.

Outside the FCI, WWF also contributed by funding field projects aiming at sustainable practices on plantation- and regional level (e.g. HCVF identification in Indonesia, Partners for Wetlands Kinabatangan project, Malaysia), whereas campaign organisations such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace raised public and media awareness on the impacts of the palm oil business on forests and people, and on the responsibility of Dutch financial institutions for funding these destructive practices.

2. Strategic conservation partners

In the European business mobilisation and development of the RSPO process, much effort was put in the engagement of mainstream palm oil producers, processors, and retailers. On the producer side, this was achieved through consumer pressure in Europe that led to a series of meetings between WWF Malaysia and the Malaysia Palm Oil Association (MPOA), the powerful Malaysian producers' association. These meetings were facilitated by Teoh Cheng Hai, consultant to WWF Malaysia and former Director at Golden Hope Plantations in Malaysia. He played a key role in two directions: increasing WWF's understanding of the sector and convincing MPOA to participate in the RSPO process. MPOA's participation (as a strategic conservation partner) was crucial to initiate a process that was not only for frontrunners, but also aimed at involving companies with a 'wait and see' attitude and those that fully ignore(d) the issues raised by NGOs. This approach was taken in Malaysia. In Indonesia, bilateral talks with individual stakeholders were a more suitable approach in combination with the development of the Indonesian Palm Oil Commission (IPOC) as a strategic conservation partner.

Equally important as strategic conservation partners were the European processors and retailers Unilever and Sainsbury, two companies who were committed to sustainable purchasing even before WWF came into view. Both companies represent significant purchasing power and their involvement in the process represented an overriding signal to producers that conservation concerns in palm oil production was not solely pushed by NGOs. From 2002 onwards, the development of the roundtable concept was taken further by these companies, with support by Aarhus (UK), Migros (Switzerland), Golden Hope and WWF. The process was designed to engage the mainstream industry, not just a small sub-set of frontrunners. This was necessary to achieve the required large-scale impact and the desire to pursue real "Identity Preserved Chain of Custody" systems.

Other strategic conservation partners engaged were the banks involved in plantation finance, such as Rabobank, HSBC, ING Bank and ABN AMRO who developed specific palm oil investment policies. HSBC has been the first international bank to be fully involved, and finances no less than 20% of Malaysia's total palm oil exports. Initially, HSBC and WWF UK started a partnership with emphasis on wetlands preservation and

massive financial contribution from HSBC. Later, the bank developed a forestry sector policy and ultimately became an active player in the RSPO. One main reason for HSBC to do this, according to a representative (Roundtable 4, November 2006, in Singapore), is that its highly valued brand (US\$ 10 billion) should not be associated by the public with forest fires, haze, deforestation and human rights violations. The Dutch banks also joined the roundtable process.

As of early 2006, RSPO has grown into a platform with almost 150 members representing all stakeholder groups in the trade and finance chain of custody and key NGOs from outside the WWF Network (e.g. Sawit Watch, Oxfam, Pesticide Action Network and Tenaganita). Total membership is believed to represent at least one-third of total global palm oil production.

3. Vertical integration

Especially on the market side, vertical integration was part of the work done prior to and during the roundtable processes, and will increasingly (have to) take place once sustainable products become available to the market place. At the global level, the RSPO was created to develop a global sustainability standard and globally active banks were addressed on corporate or group level. At the regional level, industry associations, multinational plantation companies, and regional offices of financial institutions in Europe and Asia were mobilised. At the national level, the media, companies, state agencies, and NGOs were mobilised, and at the local level, work was done with individual plantations, plantation workers and surrounding affected communities. Collaboration between WWF offices (Switzerland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, China, and UK) has been critical to make this successful.

In the (public) policy domain, vertical integration has been less prominent; efforts have been made mainly in Paraguay and Indonesia where various stakeholders have been integrated at all levels to halt the deforestation rate or the conversion of HCVMs.

4. Appealing model

In an early stage of the FCI, a demonstration model of sustainable palm oil plantation management was established. The initiative was taken by the Swiss supermarket chain Migros after having read press articles about WWF Germany's 1998 campaign. Migros was concerned that the campaign would spread into Switzerland and contacted WWF CH for dialogue and joint action. Migros produces its own home brand margarine from palm oil sourced mostly from organic production in Ghana. Migros and WWF CH hired Proforest to develop a preliminary standard for sustainable palm oil production and tested the standard in the estates of the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company Limited (GOPDC), a plantation owned by the Belgian group SIAT NV. Based on this experience, a basic Identity Preserved Chain of Custody system was developed, which allowed Migros to prove the origins of its palm oil from a demonstration model site. The demonstration model also helped SIAT NV to attract donor funding to support forest restoration in another GOPDC estate, to work towards full implementation of the RSPO Principles and Criteria in its Nigerian operations, and to present an alternative at the European Business and Industry seminars organized by the FCI.

Unfortunately, the GOPDC demonstration failed to serve as an appealing model because it was considered too progressive for bulk trade oriented Asian oil palm companies. The lesson is not to strive for models that are highly performing but not representative or convincing for important stakeholders. In the past years, WWF Indonesia has signed Memoranda of Understanding with several Asian mainstream

companies. There have been similar experiences in Malaysia where plantation companies surrendered some of their land for forest restoration along the Kinabatangan River to allow elephants to migrate and reduce flooding risk of plantation land. New appealing models currently under development with roundtable member(s) will be more convincing to Asian companies. They are also more accessible for visits (logistically and culturally).

5. Conservation and development coalition

The expansion of commodities such as oil palm and soy do not only threaten forests and the associated biodiversity. There are additional ecological and social sustainability impacts, which WWF cannot address alone. In addition, when operating alone, WWF would lose credibility and support from other NGOs for a variety of reasons (expertise, political views). Building formal or loose coalitions with other NGOs in both southern (producing) and northern (trade, consumption) countries brought about benefits of information sharing, complementarity of capacities and shared workload. In the Netherlands, WWF is member of the Palm Oil Platform and the Dutch Soy Coalition, informal structures of environmental and development NGOs that coordinate lobby efforts towards companies, politicians and government, and share knowledge and information. Such coordination is crucial in order to assure that NGOs speak a common language. In the South, WWF has supported other NGOs to undertake pressure actions that it could not undertake itself. For example, WWF Switzerland and WWF Indonesia provided co-funding for members of Sawit Watch, a social NGO network, to participate in the RSPO meetings and maintained good working relations through information sharing and joint strategising.

6. Wide spread adoption

Different types of widespread adoption have occurred as result of the FCI. Through the RSPO, horizontal adoption occurs as membership of one type of company triggers other companies in other regions or countries to join. WWF stimulated this through promoting RSPO in the sector and through direct dialogue with potential partners. WWF Indonesia and the Indonesian Palm Oil Commission (IPOC) jointly organised countrywide trainings for estate managers and CEOs on High Conservation Value Forests. The growth of RSPO membership has now become an autonomous process and as a result, RSPO membership is not any longer limited to countries with high environmental awareness (Netherlands, UK, Sweden). It has also attracted members in India, China, Japan, France, and the US. RSPO now has enough members to fully cover the secretariat's activities and allow for some self-funded projects. In a similar way, vertical adoption occurred because commitments of market-based companies, including investors, triggered other plantation companies to become members, and the other way round.

Multi-loop adoption occurred with the creation of the Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS) process, which had been planned before as soy competes with palm oil in the global market and because soy expansion (in Latin America) causes conservation problems similar to those of oil palm. Roundtable processes have now been set up for several commodities: palm oil, soy, cotton, sugar, and salmon. Other roundtables have also been set up, such as coffee, without WWF involvement, but incorporating the WWF's approach. Adoption of the FCI approach in South America (applied to soy), has among other results led to a deforestation moratorium in Paraguay's threatened Atlantic Forest.

7. Exit strategy

Forest Conversion is WWF's core business, and as the end of global deforestation is not yet in sight, there is no intention to phase out of this topic. However, through the RSPO the aim is to redirect responsibility for implementation and monitoring of sustainability criteria to the main actors (producing, financing and processing companies) and their watchdogs (local social and environmental NGOs), coordinated by an independent secretariat. WWF's involvement is still strong, mostly because these roundtable processes have just begun to take off. An exit from the roundtables is not an option for the short term because its overall objectives have not yet been realised. Even if industry adopts the criteria across the board, it is still expected that implementation cannot be assured on a voluntary basis. Therefore, a future exit strategy may require effective structures to be set in place to ensure that standards are binding and enforced. As a result, WWF will probably remain involved in these processes for another 5 to 10 years to assure that certification schemes deliver the envisaged conservation goals. On the consumer side, it may be possible for WWF National Offices to phase out when their markets are largely supplied with certified sustainable oil and soy.

Strategic Principle	Applied?	Strengths	Comments
1. Conservation change mechanism	Yes	Triggered by a visible event (forest fires, haze). Good key actor analysis conducted and expert meetings held in preparation of engaging the sector. Focus on mainstream actors is key to ensure impact. Moderate WWF participation in publicity campaigns by NGO 'allies' (to keep potential strategic partners on board).	International (trade) policy opportunities insufficiently addressed.
2. Strategic conservation partners	Yes	Engagement of MPOA was especially key to success. Some large companies (producers, processors, investors) played an important role as frontrunners. Large banks were also involved, such as HSBC.	The downside of engaging a trade association is the risk that the trade association will push the agenda of laggards in its constituency.
3. Vertical integration	Yes, but not for policy domain	The input of conservation staff in European NOs enabled business mobilization Europe-wide. Coordination between European and Asian NO/POs was facilitated internally and at the RSPO.	The initiative has rightfully focused on private sector and market actors, but may have missed opportunities on international policy aspects.
4. Appealing model	Yes, but failed partially	Migros and GOPDC were frontrunners who delivered a sustainable production model on the ground. Kinabatangan provided an example in Malaysia. The RSPO itself is a model for multistakeholder commodity dialogue.	Selected model in Ghana was insufficiently representative and convincing to Asian producers. The Kinabatangan model was insufficiently integrated in the roundtable process to create cross-pollination'.
5. Conservation and development coalition	Yes	Has grown rather organically. Prior to the Roundtable WWF coordinated well with other NGOs and was open in sharing information. WWF now coordinates with NGOs in RSPO.	Coordination with NGOs not participating in the Roundtable processes is crucial for active or silent support outside the WWF Network and Roundtables.
6. Widespread adoption	Yes	All three types of adoption applied. There is definitely a reduction in external pressures. Tangible field results include the 85% reduction in the deforestation rate in Paraguay and the 10 fold reduction in size of palm oil border plantation in Borneo that can be directly attributed to FCI. The soy roundtable was adapted but based on the RSPO.	An eagerness to scale-up efforts may lead to WWF to lose control over the process (watering down the influence of both WWF and the 'first movers'), which increases the risk of a take-over by laggards.
7. Exit strategy	Yes	A process is in place to reduce WWF's own role and let NGOs and market players govern the RSPO. WWF will stay involved in monitoring and addressing deforestation issues.	Market functioning may not address all concerns (e.g. best performing companies are certified but bad practices remain). An exit strategy should assure that voluntarily adopted practices remain binding for all stakeholders in the sector.

VI Eastern Himalayas Ecoregional Program (TAL) in Nepal

Introduction

Nepal entered into the modern era of conservation with the enactment of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act and declaration of Royal Chitwan National Park (RCNP) as the first Protected Area (PA) of the country in the year 1973. In those early days, priority was given to the protection of key species and representative ecosystems. Within a short period of two decades, a network of 16 PAs covering more than 19% of the country's area was established. However, with the increased number of wildlife within PAs, human-wildlife interactions and conflicts increased. In addition, these PAs became islands creating a big challenge of maintaining the viable population of key wildlife species within the confined boundaries. During 1999, a workshop was organised in Kathmandu to develop a biodiversity vision for the country. The workshop recommended the connection of the PAs within one large landscape level conservation strategy. Consequently, Terai Arc Landscape (TAL), a trans-boundary landscape between Nepal and India was identified. The landscape was identified to contain 11 protected areas, 4 in Nepal and 7 in India. The TAL covers an area of 49,500km². In Nepal, TAL extends over an area of 23,199 km².



In the TAL area, the majority of the population lives in poverty. More than 70 % of the population does not grow sufficient food to last through the year. The poor households own very few resources and hence rely on forests for their subsistence. The majority of people in TAL-Nepal still rely on traditional agriculture, livestock raising and forestry. Thus, livelihoods and forests are inextricably linked. Sustainable forest management in TAL-Nepal is an important option of poverty reduction.

WWF has envisioned a long-term conservation approach for TAL. The basic premise of landscape level conservation is

working beyond the boundaries of the protected areas for the conservation of biodiversity. The TAL represents a new paradigm in conservation planning, with a shift of site-based conservation to landscape-level conservation. This allows one to take into account ecological processes, which are otherwise not taken care of, and establish ecological corridors.

The scientific basis for the identification of the landscape was the distribution of tigers across the landscape. The landscape links PAs and adjoining forests through biological corridors to facilitate wildlife movement and genetic dispersal. Actions to address the threats on biodiversity conservation are therefore focused on the restoration of identified corridors and bottlenecks. This links up with priorities within the Government of Nepal, on landscape level conservation, as reflected in major policy documents including the Tenth Plan (2002-2007) and Nepal Biodiversity Strategy 2002. However, the TAL also takes into account and links up with poverty reduction objectives, such as reflected in the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Agenda for Nepal.

Several issues of biodiversity conservation and sustainable livelihoods are interlinked. Analysis of biodiversity loss in the TAL revealed complex and multiple causes for it. In order to address these complex issues with a joint effort by various partners working in TAL, the TAL-Nepal Strategic Plan (2004-2014) was developed. The Implementation Plan prepared to translate these strategies into action was finalised shortly after that and was endorsed by the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation (MFSC).



Eastern Himalayas Mountain tops
Photo: © WWF / Anne-Marie Kloet

1. Conservation change mechanism

For developing the TAL strategic plan, an elaborate exercise of problem analysis was carried out, resulting in detailed insight into threats and root causes. Most of the threats are internal and associated with poverty and a low level of development. There are few external threats or root causes; these are mostly associated with cross-boundary problems with India (e.g. smuggling of non-timber forest products, illegal movement of cattle, cheap food imports, etc.). The analysis does not specifically indicate opportunities or triggers.

Based on this analysis, the strategy was developed to address the identified root causes: both local issues and external drivers. Five major thematic areas were identified: governance, sustainable forest management, species and ecosystem conservation, Churia watershed conservation, and sustainable livelihoods. Awareness and capacity enhancement activities are distributed across the thematic areas. The TAL strategic plan then lists per thematic area the various targets to be achieved within the coming 10 years. Identification of these targets is based on existing experiences and on the need to tackle new areas (threats, root causes).

The TAL Strategic Plan serves as a tool to engage all key landscape level partners and stakeholders to work for a common goal under the lead of the Ministry of Forests and

Soil Conservation. Thus, the TAL basically aims to support identified partners in realising the targets as identified within each of the five thematic areas. To do so, achievements realised by the various partner organisations to date for each of the 5 thematic areas have been indicated. For example, under sustainable forest management, it is stated that 'experiences have shown that the cooperation and participation of local communities is the key for the success of any conservation and development initiative. The TAL strategy aims to build effective partnerships with local people as resource managers, beneficiaries, and stewards to achieve its goal through proper management of forest resources under appropriate management regime. Community forestry, collaborative forestry, private forestry and leasehold forestry have been identified as the potential forest management modes in TAL'.

As another example, under governance we find activities to ensure a conducive environment for equitable benefit sharing, gender sensitiveness, social inclusion, transparency, and accountability of the institutions involved. These include a review of existing policies, formulation of new policies and implementation of these, advocacy work, capacity building and coordination events (including cross-boundary).

Of the various partners, the main areas of expertise and ongoing projects are listed. For instance, for WWF, the initial support in the area of species conservation has been diversified into a number of other areas of global importance, including sustainable livelihoods. WWF is now also supporting restoration of critical areas outside PAs. Reference is made to innovative measures that were developed, including focus on alternative energy use to reduce pressure on forests, mobilisation of communities for retarding poaching and other illegal activities, complete packaging of income generating activities focused on the poor, working based on strengths of local stakeholders using smallest possible field structure, flexible project planning and implementation mechanism involving beneficiaries, joint project governance structure with government.

Thus, it can be concluded that the TAL Strategic Plan gives an overview of what has been done so far and has set priorities of activities to be strengthened. This is largely based on promising approaches. It is not entirely clear, however, which of the targets are based on well-tested approaches, ready for widespread adoption, and which will still need to be tested out. For instance, it seems that Collaborative Forest Management has not yet been fully developed, i.e. there is promising progress, but a fully developed approach is not yet available.

2. Strategic conservation partners

It seems that in 2002, there were 13 different bilateral and multilateral agencies working in the TAL area. These agencies spend more than 38 million US dollars over a period of 5 years in the programs related to sustainable development, natural resource management, and biodiversity conservation. This shows the great potential for partnership building among these agencies in order to realise the TAL vision. The major thrust of the TAL Strategic Plan is to leverage the relative strengths of individual partners to achieve the conservation and livelihood vision.

The TAL states that it is impossible for a single agency, with its limited financial and human resources, to address the complex and interrelated issues in the TAL landscape. Thus, consolidation and synergy through strong partnerships is essential. The government, donors, INGOs/NGOs, local communities, and conservation organisations all work together to realise the TAL vision. Within the TAL, bilateral and multi-lateral partners will work in the TAL districts under the leadership of the Ministry

of Forests and Soil Conservation (MFSC). Thus, the MFSC can be considered the main strategic partner.

It seems that there are no private sector partners working as strategic partners within this programme. The Implementation Plan refers to the fact that 'a mechanism for public and private partnership is expected to be developed.'

A lot of work has been done on developing and strengthening community organisations, of which there are now many. Some of these have developed viable commercial initiatives such as those on tourism. Some have been granted community control over sizeable forest blocks, which are adjacent to key protected areas, such as Chitwan NP and Bardia NP. Thus, there are commercially operating community organisations, some of which may develop into strategic partners.

3. Vertical integration

Basically, two different levels of execution are involved; the local (District) level and the landscape (regional) level. The linkages between these two levels are critical, as priority, setting at local level should fit into the landscape vision. Landscape level coordination is done at national level, and through TAL, coordination and management mechanisms (see below). Special attention is given to trans-boundary interaction between Nepal and India. It is stated that 'trans-boundary conservation issues are to be addressed through joint efforts between Nepal and India'. Such a mechanism does not yet exist, although there have been some ministerial coordination meetings between Nepal and India, and there are projects operating successfully at the two sides of the boundary.

There are no linkages with global level activities, which is understandable by the fact that no global root causes or opportunities were identified. One may wonder whether in due time, linkages may be established with globally operating actors such as tourist operators to promote eco-tourism activities.

4. Appealing model

As indicated above, it is not clear which of the proposed projects/approaches are based on well-established approaches (i.e. an appealing model is available and ready for widespread adoption) and which would still require the development of an appealing model. The TAL strategic plan does not explicitly refer to an approach of developing or using appealing models, learning from that and then expanding the model through (strategic) partners. However, this approach may be more or less implicitly adopted, as several successful approaches have been developed, such as community-based forestry, tourism and conservation management. The TAL also puts much emphasis on an M&E system including mechanisms to learn from each other and identify successes as well as gaps or areas for research. In addition, there is mention of action research and piloting, but a mechanism of how models serve as a basis for wide-spread adoption at landscape level is not mentioned.

In the 2004-2005 annual progress report, the following successes (appealing models?) were identified:

- Community forests allocate land to the poor;
- Rhino Count 2005;
- Formation and institutionalization of District Forest Coordination Committee (DFCC);
- Collaborative Forest Management.

5. Conservation and development coalition

The TAL Strategic Plan was developed through a joint effort of the MFSC and key landscape level conservation partners including USAID, SNV Nepal, UNDP, DFID, and WWF. The Implementation Plan, designed to translate the TAL strategies into ground action, was developed in the similar consultative manner, i.e. with other key stakeholders at national, district, and local level in different forums. WWF coordinated the processes of formulation of both the Strategic Plan and the Implementation Plan.

The MFSC is the chair of the National Biodiversity Conservation Committee, with a TA Coordination Committee falling under it, whose function will be high level steering of TAL implementation. In it are the relevant ministerial sectors, implementing partners, NGOs, and private sector representatives.

Accordingly, this strategic principle has been worked-out very well in TAL

6. Wide spread adoption

The fundamental philosophy of the landscape approach of the TAL is based on up scaling of results from fragmented projects towards greater scales and greater impacts. This should be achieved by coordination, collaboration, increased funding and learning mechanisms.

In doing so, there are no key actors involved from the private sector or those representing key threats or opportunities.

A major thrust towards wide spread adoption is capacity building of key government institutions, such as the MFSC.

7. Exit strategy

WWF is one key player of this initiative in terms of taking the initiative and in terms of funding it. Ownership is with the MFSC and other national and local agencies and partners. Thus, there is less need to develop an exit strategy, as responsibility is already with national Government and local community organisations. There is, however, a substantial amount of capacity building, and there will be need to build up national and local capacities to ensure sustainable funding, good coordination, and management skills of communities to manage natural resources, independent of external support but under strict checks and balances of Government.

Much attention is being given in the TAL strategy to establish sustainable funding mechanisms. This includes different options that will be worked out: revenues from tourism and visitors to the PAs, TAL Trust Fund, use of water rights, proceeds from sale of NTFPs and timber, community endowment funds, carbon funds, creative conservation fees.

Strategic Principle	Applied?	Strengths	Comments
1. Conservation change mechanism	Partly	The principle is implicitly applied through the focus upon successful approaches and projects by various partners in the area. Targets are identified mainly on the basis of the threats analysis.	There is no specific focus upon opportunities or triggers, e.g. as associated with key actors from private sector.
2. Strategic conservation partners	Yes	The focus of the TAL programme is at strengthening existing agencies and projects within a common landscape vision and management framework. The MFSC is the main strategic partner within Nepal Government.	No private sector agencies are involved. For some root causes a successful conservation change mechanism still needs to be developed.
3. Vertical integration	Partly	The core of the TAL strategy is good relations between local level activities and the landscape vision. Ground activities and national coordination are well established. Global level linkages are not established.	There are few external conservation threats, apart from relations with India. The cross-boundary collaboration between India and Nepal is not yet developed.
4. Appealing model	Yes	A strategy of working from successful models to widespread adoption is not explicitly mentioned, but appealing models certainly exist in the programme area and these are being expanded.	The approach of appealing models is implicitly being adopted by several TAL partners.
5. Conservation and development coalition	Yes	WWF has taken the lead in bringing together various TAL conservation and development partners, and in developing and working out the TAL strategy. Various government, NGO and development partners are involved, and united in management structures.	Private sector is mentioned but it is not clear whether really involved.
6. Widespread adoption	Yes	The fundamental thrust of the TAL approach is to move from sites to a landscape coordinated approach. The approach is supported by a strong M&E system and exchange of successful approaches.	Too early to know whether the approach will work, there are not yet concrete impacts from the TAL approach.
7. Exit strategy	Yes	Ownership is already with national and local agencies. However, WWF is much involved in capacity building, coordination and finding funding sources. An exit strategy is part of the TAL strategy.	

VII South West Amazon Ecoregion Program in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru

Introduction

The south-western Amazonian (SWA) moist forests contain some of the richest forest communities on Earth covering more than 2 million km² of northern Bolivia, south-eastern Peru and western and central Brazil. The first 3-year phase (2001-2004) of the south-western Amazon Program was supported by WWF-Netherlands, WWF-Sweden, and WWF-US and focused its strategies on landscape conservation through protected areas creation, zoning, and promotion of sustainable forest management. From 2004 onwards, non-WWF donors (USAID and the Moore Foundation) contributed almost US\$ 10 million to conservation programmes in SWA.

In recent decades, development pressures have increased in specific areas of the Southwest Amazon ecoregion. WWF has prioritised the most threatened areas as the main program areas to implement this project. The region encompasses the main south-western tributaries of the Amazon basin: the Yurua, Purus, Madre de Dios / Mamoré and Guaporé / Itenez rivers in Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru. The ecoregion is still largely forested, and a patchwork of areas with different degrees of (formal) protection, which differ from country to country, but can generally be clustered in five categories:


1. Nature conservation areas, usually prone to illegal activities due to lack of resources;
2. Indigenous territories, with various degrees of control by the indigenous communities;
3. Extractive or sustainable use areas, usually with preferential use rights for local communities
4. Forest reserves, usually available for commercial logging operations
5. 'Open access' areas; forests with no formal protected status, but subject to forest legislation

Throughout the ecoregion, deforestation for cattle ranching inside and outside protected areas as well as illegal logging, unplanned infrastructure and soybean plantations are worrisome. The rural population in the SWA (approximately 700,000 people) are also important agents in resource depletion due to lack of economic alternatives (declining forest product prices) with consequent expansion of the cattle ranching. The role of Extractive Reserves (units aimed at matching socio-economic development and environmental conservation) is under threat if major problems related to their implementation are not overcome. Indigenous Territories and Nature Conservation Areas are prone to degradation due to outside pressures and lack of resources. Predatory logging occurs in all areas except for (most) Indigenous Territories, as the demand for wood greatly exceeds the available managed production. Settlement projects and expansion of industrial agriculture and cattle ranching are located in open access areas, which are the main sources of timber in the region. This timber is often extracted without licences and therefore illegal.

To address these threats, WWF employs a myriad of activities with dozens of partners across the three countries. Until recently, there appears to have been little (international) coordination between field-, policy, and market activities and between activities on local, national, regional, and global scale. Through this lack of integrated analysis, opportunities for widespread adoption and identification of strategic conservation partners seem to have been missed. Based on the lessons WWF learned from the past, and stimulated by the recently launched Amazon Keystone Initiative,

WWF is now developing a pan-Amazonian vision and a coordinating body called the *Amazon Network Team*.

In the Brazilian Amazon alone, the rate of deforestation has peaked at approximately 25,000 km² per year at the turn of the century, but recently decreased to about 15,000 km² per year, which is about the long-term average for the past decades. Successes have been achieved in the declaration of protected areas and the adoption of FSC in large blocks of privately managed forests. However, outside these areas, the drivers of deforestation have hardly changed, and deforestation is expected to increase with increased global demand for timber, meat, feedstuffs, and biofuels. The challenge for WWF is to ensure protected areas will be properly managed in the future and to develop mechanisms to safeguard the areas that do not have an official protected status, such as extractive reserves and other communally managed areas.



Cattle ranching and forest burning near the Rio Branco River in the Brazilian Amazon. Brazil
Photo: © WWF-Canon / Mark Edwards

1. Conservation Change Mechanism

The WWF strategy in the Amazon is to increase the cost of land conversion (deforestation) and unsustainable practices, and raise the revenues of sustainable forest management. The former strategy includes the creation and implementation of protected areas and support to the development and implementation of government policies to curb illegal logging, for example.

To increase the cost of unsustainable use, collaboration with national and local governments on land use regulation (zoning, management plans, creation of protected and sustainable use areas) was the main approach. At a local level, this has been most successful in areas with low threats and relatively low economic stakes, such as Acre in Brazil. The Brazilian ARPA (Amazon Region Protected Areas) Programme has been successful to identify, demarcate, and develop millions of hectares of Protected Areas in the Brazilian Amazon over the past decade. Funds raised from, among others, the World Bank and the Moore foundation should help fill an endowment fund with sufficient resources to perpetually fund the ARPA areas, which according to WWF would cover 10% of the Brazilian Amazon biome.

To increase the value of standing (protected and unprotected) forest, various field projects aimed to make commercial and community based forest management - where allowed - as economically viable as agriculture and cattle ranching. This was done by removing technical and market barriers. This has partially succeeded in Acre, where it has been possible to generate forest based income from sustainable timber harvesting. However, substantial amounts of resources in community organising, capacity building and certification were required, and overall benefits seem not to have increased enough to trigger a widespread shift to sustainable forest management. At the onset of the programme, possible links with national and global markets were identified but the decision was taken to first invest in (productive) capacity of communities and local enterprise. In some cases, the lack of parallel market development has led to missed opportunities and disappointment with forest product producers. Even within a conducive policy context, it may take long to develop robust social and market structures that ensure sustainable forest management.

The area under sustainable forest management (FSC) and protected areas has increased substantially, which in theory reduces predatory logging and land speculation practices. However, as long as no robust protection measures are in place, it is uncertain whether these areas can be effectively preserved when pressures increase (cattle, soy, or biofuels). Management of 'sustainable use' areas throughout the SWA remains a challenge and conservation change mechanisms for open access and sustainable use areas still have to be further developed. The Protected Areas approach for ARPA still has to acquire long-term (endowment) funding for its long-term sustainability.

Three Conservation Change Triggers have contributed to changing the balance between sustainable and destructive practices:

- The installation of a 'green' government in 1998 provided a conducive environment to establish a forest based economy in Acre state, and to involve communities in sustainable resource extraction;
- The murder of Sister Dorothy Stang led to a crackdown on illegal logging operations and corrupt officials in Brazil's environmental monitoring agency IBAMA. This crackdown sent a shockwave through the sector and capitalized on the environmental policies and monitoring systems that have been developed with support of the environmental movement, including WWF, over the past decade;

- The election of populist indigenous leader Evo Morales as president of Bolivia resulted in the replacement of the entire staff of the protected areas (PA) service SERNAP. This paralysed most of the work that WWF carried out on PAs in Bolivia, which was mostly land-use policy oriented. However, as Morales views the PAs as potential land reform site for disadvantaged highland indigenous communities, lowland local (departmental) governments now seek cooperation with WWF to 'protect' these areas from an invasion of 'highlanders'. WWF is careful to use this trigger, given the opportunistic motives of the lowland department governments.

2. Strategic conservation partners

In forest management, companies in the commercial forestry sector (production and trade) are the main strategic partners on the supply side. In Brazil, Acer, Ecoleo, and other buyers have paid good prices for community forestry logs. In Peru, a similar partnership was foreseen with Mahogany producer Florestal Venao, but this company chose another partner to develop sustainable forestry after disagreement between two of their community partners and WWF. In Brazil, for example, six logging companies have been certified or are being certified, managing 155,000 ha of forestland. Logging companies and communities managing forests are organised in producer groups to achieve economies of scale in marketing and sales. Through the Global Forest Trade Network (GFTN, a network of national FSC initiatives that link supply and demand), 350 international buyers can be reached, but production has to have sufficient scale. Lack of investment in forestry equipment is a main bottleneck to develop volume and (economically) sustainable forestry. WWF could develop strategic partnerships with financial institutions to provide credit to certified companies.

Hydrocarbon exploration companies have been approached to voluntarily stay out of indigenous lands and protected areas in their concessions. So far, one Chinese company has reacted positively. Voluntary commitments are deemed the best way forward as local and national governments are reluctant or unable to enforce environmental legislation in these isolated (lowland rainforest) areas. The Government of Peru has just stated that it will not award three lots overlapping with Territorial Reserves for indigenous people in voluntary isolation.

In zoning, planning, and implementation of protected areas, national and local governments are strategic partners and donors such as the World Bank, Moore Foundation and bilateral development agencies are funding partners of strategic importance. Currently, the establishment of ARPA areas and associated funding are exceeding targets, but commitments to the (less exciting) endowment fund lag behind and WWF is now exploring alternative mechanisms, such as payment for environmental services, to supplement the endowment fund.

In terms of financial institutions, the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) is a major investor in infrastructure (the IIRSA programme). As IDB's ecological and social standards were considered weak, WWF in a consortium with other NGOs developed better standards for IDB's perusal. WWF also supports HSBC in the development of environmental policies, as a spin-off of their Global partnership on freshwater, which also covers the Amazon basin.

In terms of retail and construction companies, USA and Brazilian retailers and wholesale users of wood- and non-timber forest products are addressed to source responsibly. So far, no major agreements have been signed that directly involve SWA products, but with increased production capacity SWA resources are likely to be included in the near future.

3. Vertical integration

Given the huge and sparsely populated SWA region with its high biological diversity, forest quality and tradition in non-timber forest product production, there are good opportunities for production of certified specialty products for international (and urban Brazilian) markets. However, the size of the area and the scale of threats (major infrastructure and agricultural expansion) require huge amounts of resources to implement protective measures. Thus, linkages to (inter)national markets and to policies are essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of the forest-based economy.

At the local level, WWF has taken the following approach to ensure supply of sustainable forest products:

- Capacity building with local communities, cooperatives and enterprises to manage forests sustainably;
- Improve local forest and land use plans and sustainable use and co-management policies;
- Improve local government capacity to implement and monitor these plans and policies.

At national level, the following initiatives were taken to promote the protection of standing forests and create demand for certified forest products:

- Successful lobby on the Brazilian Federal government to upkeep the 80% Legal Forest Reserve requirement in the Amazon;
- Successful lobby on the Brazilian Federal (Forest Bill) and State governments to adopt legislation and planning / zoning supportive to sustainable forest management;
- Successful advocacy for change in the forest code in Peru (in 2000 or 2001) followed by provision of critical support for its implementation;
- Development of a framework for actions on hydrocarbon development in Peru, to identify threats, key actors (hydrocarbon companies, financial institutions) and strategic interventions (national policies);
- Create domestic demand by the establishment of a National Buyers' Group and support to the 'Green Cities' campaign of Greenpeace that promotes the public procurement of certified timber in Brazilian cities. In Bolivia similar initiatives were developed.

At international and global level:

- Established contacts with national and international buyers of NTFPs and provided marketing support beyond the region to NTFP producers;
- Linked up the domestic certified producers groups to the GFTN;
- Addressed ACTO (the regional Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation) to develop a cross-boundary protected areas strategy and integrate protected area system priorities in the agenda of key (economical) sectors;
- Successfully addressed the World Bank and foundations to fund ARPA.

Although some international and trans-boundary work was done, most of these activities have been limited to the local or national domain. The internal planning- and decision making procedures of the WWF network (at the time) hampered trans-boundary cooperation and coordination between the different Amazon countries. At the same time, there was little structured cooperation between Northern and Amazon offices on market opportunities. Where cooperation on vertical linkages existed (example of timber through GFTN), the produced volumes, and quality were insufficient to meet international market demands.

4. Appealing model

Most models in SWA do not have sufficient local executive capacity and/or access to markets at this stage and the 'Bolivarian' revolution in Bolivia has affected most activities set up with SERNAP and the often obstructive policy environment in Rondônia has made it difficult to get anything established. Still, a number of promising and even working models have developed:

In Rondônia, Brazil, cooperation between the WoodShop Company and local communities (ASMOREX) led to increased income for both parties from sustainable timber, but company payments to ASMOREX leadership and internal governance are considered problematic. A pilot on *Copaiba* oil harvesting failed because the product lacked the quality required for high-value markets.

In Acre, Brazil, appealing models have been developed at different levels:

- Local level: community based non-timber forest product harvesting and processing initiatives (copaiba, brazil nut); Antimary State Forest Management plan which includes zoning, concessions for extractivism, timber harvest plan and complaints mechanism as a model for private sector-community partnerships in sustainable timber production;
- State level: Producers' groups for certified community forestry (CFPG) and commercial forestry (PFCA) enterprises, covering over 100,000 ha of forests; Asimanejo, a lobby- and communication network of progressive forestry entrepreneurs was created as a 'social circle' around the first FSC-certified logging company in Acre; it aims to develop understanding and willingness with other companies to join FSC certification schemes.

ARPA, through its support by the Brazilian Government and its independent implementation through FUNBIO, the implementation body, has attracted funding from a wide range of donors and should be considered a successful model for protected area system development on national scale.

In Peru and Bolivia the following appealing models were developed:

- Community based timber harvesting and processing initiatives (100 m³, Purus, Pucallpa);
- Surveillance committees of local indigenous groups to patrol the perimeter of their areas; have to get a formal mandate to stop loggers to be more effective;
- Co-management consortium of indigenous groups for communal reserves (Alto Purus, Peru);
- Participatory development of protected area management plans with local government and stakeholders in Bolivia.

Several policy models were developed with local and national governments. A few examples:

- The Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation law in Peru, protecting the integrity of their areas;
- Collectively developed fisheries agreements in the Purus basin and a state system of protected areas (SEANP) in Acre, Brasil;
- The creation of UDAPs, local protected area management authorities in the Bolivian departments Beni and Pando.

5. Conservation and development coalition

Many local coalitions were built to align conservation and development strategies between NGOs, to support capacity building and to embed Conservation Mechanisms in local society. For example, in 2004, an alliance was formed in Acre by local environmental NGOs (CTA, SOS Amazonia and Kanindé) and national NGOs (WWF and FSC) with considerable interests in the region. The alliance did not only coordinate its activities but also jointly proposed and implemented forest management and capacity development activities.

In Rondônia, WWF initiated the GT-RESEX (Extractive Reserves working group), a multi-stakeholder forum involving NGOs and government (SEDAM) representatives to specifically address the issue of management of extractive reserves. As no funding exists for development of sustainable economic activities in extractive reserves, none have management plans and many are prone to illegal logging. Weak representation in the management of extractive reserves of the Rubber Tappers Association and SEDAM has limited the effectiveness of the GT-RESEX so far.

In Peru, a coalition was formed with the national organisation that works on indigenous issues, bringing together local associations of native communities to work together to build capacity within native communities to better use and protect their natural resources.

In Bolivia, WWF managed to unite stakeholders with different and sometimes opposing interests regarding the PA, to establish a management committee for the Itinez Sustainable Use Reserve. The Management Committee for the PA includes representatives from all the communities, the municipal governments and the state government.

6. Wide spread adoption

Overall, current reality is that adoption of models is incidental, and not yet widespread, but several models show their applicability elsewhere, mostly within the national domain. Even though some models are country-specific, more interaction between country offices and (sub) projects would increase the possibilities for cross-boundary adoption.

In Brazil, many of the models developed in Acre could not be replicated in Rondônia because of policy constraints. Within Acre, the cooperation between community and private sector in timber production has been adopted in 12 areas, so that private sector forestry operations in the process of certification now cover 155,000 ha and at least 5 operators. Asimanejo functions as a platform for local adoption. Up-scaling of NTFP production and trade has backfired in some cases because increased production of *Copaiba* oil, after a successful product launch, resulted in disappointment by producers when there appeared to be insufficient market demand. As a result, WWF got stuck with 400 litres of oil and the perception that they are a buyer of oil, and not the facilitator that it wanted to be.

ARPA is in a sense unique because it aims to preserve a significant area of the largest tropical forest in the world, and by its sheer size will be difficult to replicate elsewhere. Nevertheless, the prioritisation, phasing and fundraising mechanism can function as a model for other countries to set up a comprehensive protected areas programme. There are other systems akin to it – e.g. environmental funds in Peru, PROFONAMPE, and Bolivia, FUNDESNAP. These focus on all PAs in the country – not just the ones in the Amazon. The ARPA funding base has broadened to include World Bank, Moore Foundation, USAID and other bilateral donors. Elsewhere, the ARPA model is used as

a reference in the establishment of an ambitious PA system in Costa Rica and provides useful input in the discussions with ACTO on a pan-Amazonian protected areas system.

In Bolivia, the PA management model of Itinez was adopted and adjusted by the Pando government to manage the recently established Bruno Racua Wildlife Reserve. Following the example of Beni, an UDAP (departmental protected areas authority) was also created in Pando.

In Peru, work with indigenous federations is spreading to other areas, but still with WWF's involvement.

7. Exit strategy

Throughout the SWA, WWF is still strengthening its presence, increasingly by developing alliances with other (development, local conservation and indigenous) NGOs and local governments. The general exit strategy is to develop local capacity to manage parks and sustainable use areas and ensure policies are in place to prevent deforestation and degradation. The role of the private sector does not yet seem to be clearly defined in WWF's vision; cooperation and command-and-control approaches seem to exist parallel to each other. More effective strategies (in terms of contribution to conservation and stakeholder benefits) have to be developed before WWF could start considering a phase-out. In Acre, WWF's role changed from being a distant donor to being a participating actor. In Bolivia and Rondônia, the political situation is so challenging that considerable investment is required to ensure the long term existence of PAs and obtain a position to start contributing to conservation respectively.

Generally, the Southwest Amazon programme shows that it is not realistic to assume that WWF can pull out within five to six years.

Conclusions

The strategic principles have been generally taken into account when designing the South West Amazon programme, but because of the size of the programme, the multitude of donors and funding sources, and its presence in three countries, until recently there has not been an overall vision or strategy for the Amazon region. This led to the more or less parallel implementation of strategies in Bolivia, Peru and Brazil, and, for the latter country, relatively much distance between the ARPA- and non-ARPA activities. The way decisions are (or were) taken within the WWF network at times hampered coordination among the involved Amazon country offices - affecting widespread adoption -, and between the Amazon offices and their Northern counterparts (addressing multinational companies and other distant actors) – affecting vertical integration. The recent establishment of the Amazon Network Initiative and the efforts towards a Pan-Amazonian vision acknowledge this, and provide the opportunity to integrally assess the ongoing programmes.

Strategic Principle	Applied?	Strengths	Comments
1. Conservation Change Mechanism	Yes	Focus on economic benefits from sustainable forestry is appealing to wide range of stakeholders in Acre; Involvement of Indigenous Communities in Conservation (co) management.	For many products, SWA is too remote to compete with regions closer to export- or consumption hubs – there should be more focus on comparative advantage of the region; Insufficient attention to (developing) demand and quality requirements for forest products; More attention could be paid to 'difficult' areas where rate of destruction is high and development of alternatives more urgent
2. Strategic Conservation Partners	Yes, but with mixed success	Logging companies and powerful state agencies (SEDAM, FUNAI) have been addressed and involved	National and international markets need more attention to ensure a demand and premium prices for sustainable forest products; partnerships mostly limited to sub-national level; several partners turned out to be unreliable
3. Vertical integration	Insufficient	Attention was paid to create access to national and international markets through creation of a buyers' group and access to the GFTN. Cooperation with Acre government resulted in pro-sustainable forestry legislation and incentives for sustainable management	The parallel development, implementation and funding of projects and programmes in the ecoregion and subsequent fragmented decision making hampered vertical integration. This is currently being addressed by among others the Amazon Network Initiative.
4. Appealing model	Yes	Successful models for NTFP and timber harvesting were developed; protected areas and forest management policies; the ARPA model of identifying, demarcating and funding of PA's is highly appealing to many donors.	Some models were introduced in a top-down manner and lack stakeholder buy-in; More attention could be given to models with private sector partners, especially in 'open access' areas.
5. Conservation and development coalition	Yes	Various local coalitions were developed, particularly for the development and implementation of protected area management plans	The coalitions don't have sufficient countervailing power yet in states like Rondônia, where commitment of involved government agencies is questionable.
6. Widespread adoption	Not yet	Within Acre, joint community-corporate forest management for timber was adopted in 12 areas. In Bolivia, local PA management authorities (UDAP's) are being set up according to a model developed with WWF.	Models developed in Acre in a positive policy context prove hard to adopt elsewhere because of poor governance and competition with cheap and illegally produced timber; capacity development to enable adoption takes considerable time; markets are often not ready to absorb increasing quantities of (unknown) timber or non-timber species / products.
7. Exit strategy	No	Implementation, monitoring, and governance structures are being developed to enable strategic partners to take over.	Even in Acre, a lot of work still has to be done to ensure there is sufficient technical, organisational, and commercial capacity to make SFM feasible. In other regions, capacity to (co)manage the forest with local stakeholders is still limited and will require additional long-term presence of WWF or the likes before an exit is possible.

VIII Colombia: Chocó-Darién Ecoregional program

Introduction

The Choco-Darién ecoregional complex is one of the Global 200. It is an area of primarily tropical moist and tropical mountain forests that runs from eastern Panama (17% of the ecoregion), the full length of the Pacific coast of Colombia (66%) and northwest Ecuador (17%), and is separated from other parts of Northern South America by the Andes Mountains. The ecoregion still possesses significant coverage of intact ecosystems, over half of the forest cover is still maintained, and nearly 10% of the region is titled as a national park or reserve, an indigenous territory or as Afro-descendent territory.


The local economy is based mostly on the extraction of natural resources - especially timber and mineral resources, much of which is illegal given that the appropriate management plans and permits are lacking - and subsistence farming. In recent years, the presence of illicit crops has increased. These illegal activities compete unfairly with sustainable alternatives such as sustainable forest management. While the legal base of the indigenous territories (*resguardos*) and the Afro-Colombian collective territories is strong within Colombian legislation, the actual management and organisational capacity of the communities is limited and they are largely politically marginalized from development decisions made regarding the future of the region. The relationship with the state has tended to be paternalistic and affected by corruption. Actual direct threats to conservation and sustainable development are the expansion of cattle ranching; the expansion of palm oil plantations; the expansion of illegal crops, illegal and unsustainable logging; and infrastructure and energy projects. Emerging threats include for example, agricultural production for biofuels and road infrastructure⁷.

The considerable coverage of protected areas and ethnic territories represents an important conservation opportunity and is one of the basic elements of WWF's ecoregional vision and strategy, which aims to consolidate and stabilise governance and the sustainable use and management of ethnic lands through the implementation of an Ecoregional Action Plan (EAP). The hypothesis is that effective management of community lands will ensure conservation of biodiversity and the strengthening of governance systems will influence decisions in favour of sustainable development in the region. The WWF Colombia Programme has carried out a thorough ecoregional analysis, which forms the basis of the ecoregional strategy and vision, the latter being formulated as follows:

The Chocó Darién will be recognized and managed as a large conservation unit that guarantees the conservation of a fully representative set of all natural communities maintains ecological processes on a local, regional, and trans-regional level and is resistant to periodic large scale disturbances such as El Niño events. It will be a region built on an alternative development model where individuals and organisations are engaged, influence local and regional development and sustainably manage their resource base.

The approach taken by the Chocó-Darién ecoregional program as a whole is subject of this case study.

⁷ For example IIRSA: South American Infrastructure Integration Initiative. An initiative that aims to develop road and water transport infrastructure to stimulate regional economic integration and development.



Local Non Timber Forest Products, Choco, Colombia
© WWF-Canon / Diego M. Garces

1. Conservation change mechanism

Historically, the Chocó has been relatively isolated from political and economic processes in the interior of the continent. This physical isolation and lack of integration has favoured an economy based on extraction of natural resources, largely timber and mineral resources, driven by and benefiting interests outside the region. A major threat is the strategic position of the ER along the Pacific where there is considerable interest in further expanding road and port infrastructure for greater regional integration and access to international markets, the expansion of the palm oil industry, and the expansion of the electrical interconnections.

The four main strategic lines of the Ecoregional Action Plan (EAP) are:

- 1) Support the establishment and effective management of conservation areas on public and private lands and in ethnic territories;
- 2) promote sustainable resource use and sustainable production and extraction systems;
- 3) promote legal and political frameworks that are favourable for conservation, sustainable livelihoods and strengthened governance; and
- 4) strengthen the capacities of all relevant actors (technical, institutional, organisational, political, educational and on communication).

The opportunity or trigger to collaborate for the 'key' stakeholders, i.e. the local communities, is the short-term benefits that can be obtained. One crucial benefit for local communities is the acknowledgement of their collective land ownership and improvement of their territorial governance. To date, 12 ethnic territories covering 430,000 hectares count on natural resource management plans and internal statutes to guide actions in the territory as a result of EAP actions. The WWF work in the ER has generated forest management plans for four communities and their territories (one each in Ecuador and Panama and two in Colombia), business plans for forest management, tourism and agricultural activities, and land-production initiatives (170) have been established; and on-farm research experiments (250)

have been conducted. Significant progress has been made in terms of agreements and commitments achieved with local authorities and government bodies regarding conservation and sustainable development agendas. These initiatives have been promoted by local and regional organisations with the support of national/international NGOs. The improvement in food security or the economic benefits of marketing forests products are more difficult to quantify.

The chosen *conservation mechanism* can be considered successful as it links the multiplicity of actors and processes at the local level with regional, national, and international levels. The approach facilitates the establishment of alliances and strengthens networks of actors. In essence, the mechanism promotes a sustainable production system by local people and the private sector; introduces economic alternatives to improve food security; strengthens the capacity of the community-based organisations; and improves their (territorial) governance over natural resources.

The chosen conservation mechanism in essence promotes a sustainable production system by local people and the private sector; introduces economic alternatives to improve food security; strengthens the capacity of the community-based organisations; and improves their (territorial) governance over natural resources. The basic premise is that ecological functionality will be addressed by enhancing the forest management and strengthening a protected areas network. The strategy of enhancing territorial governance as means of confronting threats is coherent with the social and cultural context in the region. Together with partner organisations, ample attention is given to develop the enabling conditions needed for stakeholders to make their own long-term conservation and sustainable use decisions and commitments. The local poor communities are rightfully seen as 'partners in development'.

2. Strategic conservation partners

At local level, 'key' partners like community councils, local communities, NGOs/CBOs, private reserves and National Parks are successfully involved. Under this heading, however, the focus is at non-conservation oriented partners from the private sector and public, which are involved in various ways.

In terms of private sector relations, seven business plans have been developed or are under development. One plan for commercialising non-timber forest products involves 185 new production initiatives linking them to large supermarket chains, benefiting a total of 1,400 indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. Cooperation has been sought with agro-industrial associations, such as FEDEPALMA, that have been promoting sustainable practices within the palm oil industry in Colombia. Together with state government, they have developed technical manuals for sustainable production. Currently, FEDEPALMA together with DAABON Group from Colombia and AGROPALMA from Brazil participate in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. WWF has begun work on High Conservation Value Forest (HCVF) with FEDEPALMA in Southwest Colombia and the Ministry of Agriculture and ANCUPA (the Ecuadorian palm oil producers association).

In terms of non-conservation public sector partners, WWF has a work agreement with the Ministry of Education and with the Cauca Valley education committee on environmental education. The experiences with Cauca Valley will be used by the Ministry for the design of policies and educational development plans in other parts of the country. Other strategic partners on national level - with power and influence over resource management issues, e.g. Ministry of Agriculture - who may impact local developments in the ecoregion, are targeted through advocacy, although as of yet there is limited engagement in Colombia. As mentioned above, the programme is working with the Ecuadorian Ministry of Agriculture. In Panama, forest management with linkages to buyers, has been underway for nearly 2 years, but

broader engagement with regional authorities in the Darien of Panama has not yet been developed. Engagement with non-traditional partner policy makers also includes the Ministry of Transport, the hydrocarbons agency, and ministries involved with trade and industrialization. These are key elements to influence the development approach of the country, especially taking into account the new context of the region. The policy engagement is demonstrating its relevance to the field programmes so that it creates a reference point for them and concrete conservation actions while it provides evidence to be used in national policy debates.

3. Vertical integration

WWF-CPO recognises that it is not enough to inform and empower local stakeholders and institutions, but that it is also necessary to focus on harmonization of legal, policy and market systems with conservation and sustainable use objectives on regional (departmental) and national level, and the international drivers that may influence these processes. This was highlighted in the final evaluation of the WWF-UK supported part of the programme, which states that WWF has an approach that is multi-scale (local, regional and global) and multi-stakeholder (grassroots organisations, ethnic communities, public agencies, NGOs, and development agencies). This approach has enabled the establishment and effective management of conservation areas and improvement of quality of life.

A crucial role was played by WWF-CPO in the negotiations on the Tropical Forest Conservation Act contributing to increased financial sustainability of the system. In addition, WWF signed an agreement with the Ministry of Interior to develop the regulatory framework regarding natural resource management in Afro-Colombian territories that will build on the local experiences of developing management plans and internal statutes to influence the regulatory framework of the Law 70/1993.

4. Appealing model

The indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities are aware that their livelihoods, and that of future generations, depend almost exclusively on the productive activities that they can develop using the natural resources that these territories include, in a sustainable manner. For these communities a close cultural link exists between land ownership, management and governance, thus this is rightfully a key component in the livelihoods strategy. It is also essential for the survival of their traditions and culture as a whole. Major appealing aspects of the conservation change mechanism are (a) a process-orientation to achieve tangible results, (b) linking sustainable use and sustainable livelihoods; and (c) strengthening governance and territorial planning with concrete vertical linkages from the local to the national and international levels. In the case of Colombia, territorial planning is a visible and viable entry point. The WWF activities have achieved some excellent tangible results between 2004 and 2006, e.g.:

- Development of the first sustainable forestry management model, in Tupiza priority landscape (Panamá Darien), covering 26,720 hectares of tropical forest in the Darién, with the consent of the authorities and adopted by the Ministry of Environment;
- Zoning and forest management plan for 69,000 ha of forests belonging to five Embera communities, management plans developed in Guapi (100,000 ha), Mayorquín (18,774 ha), Yurumanguí (52,144 ha), Raposo (19,014 ha) and Bahía Málaga (7,000 ha). In the Nariño Pacific coast 150,000 ha of mangroves have been included in a management plan (zoning) that is being implemented by the Community Councils and the piangueras;

- Internal statutes that address the indigenous organisations and management of the territories and natural resources were developed in Calima (77,777 ha), Bahía Málaga, Tapaje (149,000 ha), Cajambre (75,700 ha) and Guapi;
- Three initiatives of sustainable forest management consolidated, covering 300,000 hectares of forest ecosystems (2 in Colombia and one in Ecuador). Forests are managed using sustainability criteria and according to plans endorsed by the competent authority. Transformation and commercialisation are carried out under policies of social and environmental accountability, and there is equitable distribution of benefits;
- One initiative of community ecotourism consolidated, with a business plan in place, and adjusting its practice to identified criteria for sustainable tourism;
- Three local initiatives to transform forest products, with a business plan in initial stages of formulation (marmalades, honey, handicrafts);
- Two initiatives to defend collective interests endorsed by nearly 20 organisations of diverse nature.

There are also various appealing examples in terms of social empowerment and engaging citizens for environmental action:

- Individuals and organisations of local communities have legal tools, know-how and commitment to participate in decisions that affect their territories and natural resources. They promote protection measures, such as the Baudo Delta, or protected area for Málaga Bay and develop agreements with others on natural resource management (mangroves, piangua, watershed protection);
- 15 organisations actively participate in processes of monitoring, impact mitigation, and prevention of threats arising from the establishment of proposed infrastructure and agricultural development projects, specifically 2 infrastructure projects and an incentive policy to expand oil palm cultivation in Esmeraldas, Ecuador;
- 1,400 families and organized groups of producers directly linked to the establishment and development of production-transformation-marketing initiatives with 185 production-transformation initiatives, in agriculture, fishing, and tourism;
- A working group with small oil palm producers and the Ministry of Agriculture in Ecuador was established and signed an agreement to adopt responsible oil palm sustainable management practices.

The model is acceptable to a variety of landowners: be they collectively held territories, departments, municipalities, or private reserves. WWF is the international organisation with the longest and broadest presence in the Chocó directly working in the Afro-Colombian collective and indigenous territories, but they are looking to form future alliances with other organisations working in or considering working in the region, such as Oxfam GB. The approach has been highlighted as an attractive model for entities such as the European Commission given the integration of governance relevant to establishment peaceful conditions and the multi-stakeholder collaborative approach.

5. Conservation coalition

WWF is a member of the NGO-forum 'Foro Nacional Ambiental', which also includes other network organisations such as the Ecofondo (with more than 300 NGO members). The *Foro* influences national level institutions through advocacy, and work to date is generating a debate around the future development in the region and has influenced the debate and outcome of the new Forestry Law, the development of the environmental sector, discussion on development for different regions of the Colombia (Chocó mentioned above). WWF is part of a Memorandum of Understanding signed with several important conservation

organisations⁸ to design and implement the Colombian Protected Areas System Action Plan (CPASAP) related to the CoP VII of the CBD.

WWF is a member of a coalition of organisations trying to influence land use planning and use in the northwest of Ecuador, especially regarding the expansion of oil palm. Cooperation with development NGOs seems further linked to program implementation, especially on a local level. Most local organisations depend on WWF for funding or counterpart funds. WWF Colombia Office supports focused capacity building of local communities and organisations for social empowerment and conflict management. Strengthening these actors means they will become able to play their own independent role in appropriate planning and conservation. WWF also increases the capacity of local and regional government to contribute to decentralized and local planning and to engage national level government. Currently, work is underway with four of the five regional environmental authorities (departmental biodiversity strategies and land use planning in Nariño and Cauca Valley, departmental protected areas and forest management planning in Chocó and Urabá), who hold 72% of the total environmental budget) and are responsible for territorial planning and natural resource management. Work is also underway with National Parks nationally and in the region. Together with them WWF designed and implemented an assessment tool for protected areas management effectiveness.

It is worth mentioning that the general institutional behaviour of the WWF is seen by many organisations as highly positive and very cooperative. Importantly, WWF is seen as open, sensitive and understanding to the particular context, rhythms and cultural characteristics of beneficiaries, and effectively engaged with government agencies.

6. Wide spread adoption

Various elements of the conservation mechanism have been adopted or are sustained by other organisations on various levels (local land use planning, regional protected areas systems using the ER planning approach). Some of the strategies such as the application of legal approaches for more effective participation in decision making process and development plans (so called *conversatorios*) are being used in other localities, addressing other issues within other contexts, but replicating and magnifying the lessons learned and methodologies. This legal action was successfully adopted in the Nariño Pacific coast for mangrove conservation and the sustainable use of its natural resources (shell or piangua, among others). Based on this experience, the communities in Güiza river watershed (Nariño – Chocó ecoregion, region that shares both Chocó and Andean ecosystems) and in Coello watershed (Tolima – Andean ecoregion) are currently preparing a social action or a *Conversatorio* focused on the watershed's sustainable management and protection.

As far as can be analysed from the available information, the conservation mechanism has not been adopted by other large conservation organisations working in the ecoregion (Conservation International) or by ECOFONDO for implementation of activities in the ecoregion. Experiences and valuable lessons learned could be shared more with these organisations as well as within ECOFONDO. The EC is interested in broader application of the approach in their Peace Initiatives (called *Laboratorios de Paz* programme), in which they involve governance, territorial management and policy issues. On the other hand, the Choco-Darien programme had been stretching its alliances with other projects such ones funded by USAID and managed by Chemonics, linked to forest transformation, management, and marketing activities with OIA and the Upper Guapi Community Council (Colombia) and one in

⁸ The MoU was signed by CI, TNC, WWF, UAESPNN, the Association of Regional Corporations (ASOCARS), the Civil Society Reserves Network, the Alexander von Humboldt Biological Resources Research Institute and the Marine and Coastal Research Institute.

Ecuador aiming territorial protection of AWA territories in the provinces of Carchi, Imbabura, and Esmeraldas.

In addition, knowing WWF work on capacity building, governance and ethnic education, IBIS Latinoamerica (Danish NGO) is interested to work collaboratively with WWF in the trans-national region (Colombia – Ecuador) and in the mangrove areas to support the social change programme because they have special interest in ethnic education processes and collective rights of the ethnic groups.

7. Exit Strategy

Given the pressures related to expanded infrastructure to expand access to the Pacific, it is not likely, nor desirable, that WWF will phase out in the near future. Within the region some shifts from one area to another area may take place for which a local exit strategy will be defined. External drivers like 'biofuels' may lead to a reorientation of communities to be targeted within the ecoregion. On program level, it is not clear whether a phase-out or exit strategy has been part of the program from the outset.

In addition, there are aspects influencing sustainability, which are outside the direct area of influence of WWF. One issue is the limited technical capacity and environmental management ability of the regional environmental authorities. Another is the limited financial resources by the National Parks Authority, which limits its functionality on local and regional level.

The gained governance and management capacity by local indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities are likely to last. Appropriation of the strategies and tools is the main sine qua non condition for long-term sustainability at local level. To date, there is a great dependency of local communities on external support for such social change activities. Given their poor conditions, this is not likely to change in the near future. However, after the enabling conditions have been defined and implemented, future activities may need less technical assistance, financial and institutional support.

Strategic Principle	Applied?	Strengths	Comments
1. Conservation Change Mechanism	Yes	The chosen <i>mechanism</i> is an inclusive and comprehensive approach that generates benefits for local communities as well as the other key stakeholders. These benefits are often of non-economic nature.	The <i>trigger</i> for stakeholders is increased governance, tenure and empowerment. Local authorities see the need to increase their accountability (and therefore, political popularity) through taking part in these processes.
2. Strategic conservation partners	Yes	There are strategic partners from private sector (in undertaking a variety of business oriented initiatives), as well as regional and national governmental partners from various non-conservation sectors.	Examples are the Ministry of Agriculture, Transport and Education. There is scope to influence other sectoral authorities.
3. Vertical integration	Yes	From the start, attention has been given to linkages between the micro-, meso-, and macro-level. Valuable connections and contacts have been established. WWF-CPO is trusted and seen as a valuable partner.	Given the importance of the CARs and considering their weaknesses, more support could be facilitated on national level so they are capable to plan spatial developments and enforce the law.
4. Appealing model	Yes, but could be communicated more explicitly	Appealing model with significant benefits in terms of income, food security and especially in terms of land ownership, management and governance.	For long-term sustainability, acceptance by the CARs and integration in overall territorial planning is crucial. The benefits to the CARs – and stakeholders like the agro- and timber industry - could be made more explicit.
5. Conservation coalition	Yes	WWF-CPO participates in the national environmental forum and has links to ECOFONDO (the national fund to support Colombian NGOs).	So far, no linkages exist with development NGOs working in the ecoregion, which might be supportive to the 'social empowerment' WWF strives for. WWF has future collaboration planned with Oxfam GB.
6. Widespread adoption	Partially	Various elements of the conservation mechanism have been adopted or are sustained by other organisations on various levels.	The mechanism integrates successfully various local important aspects. The social-economic benefits of this development versus large scale development could be given more attention. This might help in getting wider acceptance.
7. Exit strategy	No	The WWF-CPO approach allows for local phase-out while building on the programme on other locations in the ecoregion.	The phase-out from supporting communities in order to establish similar work programs with other communities is yet unclear but exit strategies will be defined.

Most partners are from the 'conservation community'. Cooperation exist with environmental /nature authorities like National Parks and to some extent with regional authorities (CARs).

IX Living Rivers: Rhine, Danube and Yangtze

Introduction

The Netherlands is situated at the North Sea coast, in a delta of two main river systems: the rivers Rhine and Meuse. The River Rhine, 1,320 km long, is one of the largest European rivers with its source in the Alps in Switzerland.

Historically, rivers meandered slowly through the Netherlands, creating a dynamic landscape of river beds, floodplains, river dunes, small islands, floodplain forests and grasslands, all dominated by seasonal flooding. Because of the variety of habitats and the natural dynamics, with a riverbed that was free to move, it was a very biologically diverse ecosystem. This situation changed with the economic growth of Europe, including the Netherlands. Transport by water became a major function of these rivers, which asked for canalisation and regulation to allow for safe and fast transport. The floodplain area was reduced considerably and became fixated within a system of winter dikes (highest water level). This controlled system reduced the natural river dynamics, altering the landscape and reducing the biodiversity.

In the '80s, it became clear that with the intensification of agriculture, the low-lying pastures along the rivers became economically less viable and would become available for other uses. A contest in 1987, initiated by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, challenged landscape architects, river engineers and ecologists to come up with ideas for a new future for the Dutch river landscapes. The winning concept for such a new future, developed by a team of private experts, was the so-called 'Plan Ooievaar' (or Plan Black Stork). This concept presented an inspiring, new future for the Dutch river landscape, combining river and floodplain restoration (by providing more room to river dynamics) with economic functions like provision of clay and sand for building materials, recreation, and other uses that would support the development of such a new, dynamic and attractive river landscape. This was seen and presented as a win-win situation, where all stakeholders would benefit.

The concept of this 'Plan Ooievaar' was soon adopted by WWF Netherlands and, together with innovate advisors (Stroming Bureau and ARK Nature Foundation), transformed into a WWF Living Rivers Programme, combining both terrestrial and aquatic components of the river systems and aiming at real implementation. This programme was launched in 1992. The WWF Living Rivers Programme proposed to break or partially remove lower dikes (summer dikes) to re-open adjacent floodplains for river dynamics again, such as flooding, erosion, sedimentation, spontaneous growth, and development of original vegetation such as riparian forests. The way this should be done was by restoring old morphological features that could be identified on old river maps. In practice, this would imply the shallow removal of clay layers, digging of side channels and other interventions to bring back some of the key elements and processes of a 'living river landscape'.

As the Dutch had struggled with water for centuries and the solution was always to keep water out, the idea of increasing the dynamics of the river instead of controlling it was a revolutionary approach. Bringing back the (then) rare black stork ('ooievaar') to the floodplains was used to raise awareness and acceptance to the plan.



Living Rivers: a new side channel as part of flood restoration in Gelderse Poort, Netherlands
Photo: © WWF / Frans Schepers

1. Conservation change mechanism

Until 1995/6, governmental institutions responsible for spatial planning and river management, such as provincial governments and the Department of Public Works remained sceptical about the vision described above. During the winters of 1993/94 and 1994/95, water levels reached emergency levels in the river Rhine, leading to large scale evacuations, which proved to be a strong trigger for change: the insight that to increase safety the river needed more space to cope with such large river flows. Studies showed that just increasing the height of the dikes was no solution to prevent flooding. Strategies were defined, which minimized flood risks and simultaneously enhanced and restored the natural functioning of the River Rhine. Measures such as lowering the floodplains and (re)constructing secondary channels would result in an important reduction of the water levels at high river discharges and consequently minimize the flooding risks. To create room for the floods, large floodplain areas had to be excavated. This was seen as a great opportunity to ecologically rehabilitate the floodplains. Thus, it became obvious that the Living Rivers Programme did not only provide a solution to restore the river floodplains for conservation and socio-economic purposes, but also a new approach to reduce damage of seasonal floods. This boosted the support to the Living River concept.

The *conservation change mechanism* was an innovative vision and program to increase the capacity of the rivers, and to make the ecological recovery of the Dutch river systems economically feasible. The extraction of clay from the flood plains would increase safety by increasing the water storage capacity of the river system during high discharges. The sale of the excavated clay to the brick industry provided the necessary financial basis for floodplain restoration. The implementation of the plan was calculated to be almost budget-neutral. What was needed was political courage and administrative power. WWF Netherlands selected the

flood plain area 'De Gelderse Poort' of the rivers Rhine and Walloon on the border with Germany as a pilot. In this area, clay was removed so that the river could overflow and take its original courses. WWF Netherlands and its conservation partners closely cooperated with private sector partners, such as Delgromij BV (clay extraction) and Wienerberger (brick manufacturer). The pilot proved to be a huge success.

Under the slogan "Let natural processes rule" large herbivores (semi-wild cattle and horses) and beavers were re-introduced (natural grazing). Typical river habitat types such as river dunes, alluvial forests, and wetlands returned as did the typical flora and fauna. Many red list species (re-)appeared. Even the Black Stork showed up every now and then as a migrant species, as if inspecting its future breeding grounds. The safety against flooding has increased and within ten years time, a rich nature area developed, attracting many visitors to the area. Plans were developed to increase the tourism potential and enhance the recreational facilities. Nature tourism became a major economic driver of the area. Thousands of inhabitants of the nearby cities are regular visitors now and support the local tourism economy in the villages.

2. Strategic conservation partners

The main strategic partners were the companies Delgromij (clay mining) and Wienerberger (brick production) and government (provincial and national, especially the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries). The mining company and brick manufacturer were involved from the beginning and cooperated closely in removing the clay in such a way that an attractive floodplain restoration took place. This led to an agreement between WWF, the national union of brick producers (Koninklijke Verbond van Nederlandse Baksteenfabrikanten) and Grontmij Consultancy, whereby WWF promotes the use of bricks as a construction material and the Union promotes the excavation of clay and other construction material in a sustainable manner.

The most important implementation partners (apart from ARK Foundation who was key in the promotion of the vision and the development of model sites) were the Dutch State Forestry Service ('Staatsbosbeheer', now autonomous) and the water management authorities, both at local and national level. The State Forestry Service now has the management responsibility for most of the restored floodplains. De main water management authority ('Rijkswaterstaat') has key management responsibilities for the river itself and incorporated floodplain restoration, and a more natural river management in its business and management practices en policies.

A Steering Commission was formed as well as a specific Project Authority 'De Gelderse Poort', including all the key stakeholders and to guide all the developments. WWF Netherlands had a promoting and facilitating role. The provincial government had the formal lead in the implementation process.

WWF NL played a major role in communication. Keeping the project in the spotlights year after year has made it one of the most successful conservation projects in the Netherlands during the century, with a very positive spin-off to other rivers and smaller streams in the country and abroad, where similar approaches were adopted.

3. Vertical integration

Through advocacy and public campaigns, support to the overall vision of the Living Rivers Programme was created at all levels: municipalities, provincial authorities, and national government. Key ministries were the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV) and the Ministry for Transport, Public Works and Water Management

(responsible for the management of the main rivers). Model projects with implementation partners supported policy development vice versa.

All actors necessary for a successful implementation are now involved. However, an evaluation carried out in 2000 indicated that the organisation, steering and control of the process were less effective than it could have been. The overall institutional setting with numerous actors, commissions and steering groups were very complex and led to fragmentation and less clear decision-making processes. The role and responsibilities of the various governmental actors had to be defined more clearly. The provincial government had to coordinate and lead the implementation process more strongly. To increase the integration of conservation and flood protection throughout the whole river system, the role of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries had to be enhanced as well.

The principles of the vision 'Living Rivers' were incorporated in various national and provincial policy documents on conservation, water management, soil excavating and spatial planning. These plans in turn influenced the implementation and development of similar visions for other rivers. For example, due to the floods and taking into account future increases due to climate change, the risk assessments for flooding were adjusted in a special law ('Deltawet Grote Rivieren').

4. Appealing model

The involvement of the private sector, the tangible short-term results and the evidence that the ecological and market-based approach could create better flood protection and thus significantly lower (maintenance) costs for dikes and water management, strongly contributed to the adherence to the approach by governmental institutions.

In 2000, a Living Rivers Campaign by WWF International was organised to prepare a proposal showing how the 'Living Rivers' concept could be developed for one or two other major river systems. The proposal was meant to motivate and mobilise the wider WWF Network to bring in external conservation partners and new funding sources (from the private sector).

The success of the vision and program was amplified because the area was easily accessible and prohibitive rules for recreational visitors were absent, in contrast to many nature conservation areas in the Netherlands where recreational use is limited or prohibited. Also the vicinity of Wageningen University, which harbours many international students interested in land and water management, contributed to bringing the knowledge to the world.

Radboud University Nijmegen (NL) and the university of Duisburg-Essen (D) started cooperation in a Transnational Ecosystem-based Water Management program, with the 'Gelderse Poort' area as a key model area.

5. Conservation coalition

Over the years the vision was accepted by many, and numerous actors became involved: municipalities, polder authorities, local water management authorities, provincial government, state government, state authorities, conservation organisations, brick industry, tourism entrepreneurs etc. All have an interest in the socio-economic and nature conservation aspects of the program. As stated under paragraph 3 this led to numerous informal and formal alliances.

6. Wide spread adoption

The basic principles of restoring the river's flood plain dynamics to cope with seasonal high water flows and the combination of floodplain restoration with economic activities proved to be attractive to other areas and situations. Within The Netherlands, the model was also used for the river Meuse on the border with Belgium (also in response to massive flooding). The excavated gravel will be sold to construction companies (the slogan used to attract attention was 'Green for Gravel').

Similar projects, also called 'Living Rivers', were started by WWF Russia in 1996 and WWF Austria in 1998. In 2006, also WWF Australia defined a plan 'Living Rivers'. Based on the success of the Living Rivers program in the Netherlands a new program called 'Partners for Wetlands' was initiated by WWF in 1999. It aimed, similarly to the approach in the Netherlands, to create win-win situations with strategic partners (often non-conservation oriented) to improve wetland conservation and management by means of integrating environmental principles and sustainable use of wetlands in business and policy practices. It contained projects in Zambia's Kafue Flats, the Pantanal (Brazil), the Central Yangtze (China), Kinabatangan (Malaysia) and Danube Delta (Ukraine, later including Romania).

The Central Yangtze River is an interesting example. In 1996 and 1998, floods in the middle reaches of the Yangtze had a catastrophic impact on lives, property and economic assets. The urgent need to take affirmative action to enhance flood security was well understood at all levels of government. At that time, the approach to the problem in China was generally focused on short-term solutions such as dredging and dyke re-enforcement. However, concern was growing about the longer-term impact and sustainability of engineered solutions to the problem. Key among their concerns is the loss of biodiversity and the loss of ecosystem services such as those provided by well-functioning wetland ecosystems. The intent was to facilitate the adoption of mechanisms and processes which contribute to a long-term and sustainable approach to manage flood risk, increase livelihoods and stem the massive loss of biodiversity in the Central Yangtze region. This is very similar to the starting point and assumptions of the Dutch project.

Another example is the Danube Delta, where plans to re-open floodplains, based on an attractive vision and model sites, are being implemented. The approach is very similar to the approach in the Netherlands, while win-win situations are a combination of improved flood protection, flood plain restoration, recovery of fish stocks, and tourism development. A number of strategic partnerships with both government institutions and private sector have been developed and model sites have already been implemented. More new initiatives and model sites for floodplain restoration, including transboundary cooperation between the two countries, are underway.

A major development in Europe including The Netherlands is the re-orientation of the agricultural sector and the phase-out of non-viable agricultural areas. During the 90s, Europe was faced with several agricultural crises: cattle and chicken diseases, increased competition from countries outside the European Union, and a steady decrease in subsidies. This led to bankruptcies and during the last decade, the number of farmers that went out of business increased to 200,000 per year. Also in relation to the expansion of the European Union with new countries, the Common Agricultural Policy had to be revised. This revision is estimated to lead to 60 to 90 million hectares of land to be removed from agricultural production. This will occur first in areas considered marginal for agricultural purposes. Today, these areas are however mainly a mosaic of low input agriculture, grasslands and woodlands, creating a highly valued scenic landscape. This development creates an opportunity to develop a comprehensive European nature and landscape strategy. This led to the formulation of the 'One Europe More Nature' initiative by WWF-Netherlands and WWF International. The main model areas selected were the Coto Doñana National Park in Southern Spain; the watershed

of the Tisza river wetlands in Hungary and the water sources on the Maramures plateau in Rumania.

7. Exit Strategy

The original plan did not define an explicit exit strategy but it has a limited time horizon (all results have to be realised by 2010). However, WWF is still involved and how and when WWF stops is not (yet) clear.

Strategic Principle	Applied?	Strengths	Comments
1. Conservation change mechanism	Yes	The floods proved to be a strong trigger and restoring ecological dynamics was a strong solution to social-economic problems. This raised the awareness on the merit of nature conservation significantly. River wetlands are robust. Productive and dynamic and allow for multiple use.	
2. Strategic conservation partners	Yes	The strongest partner was the private sector that saw major commercial opportunity.	
3. Vertical integration	Yes	Because of the large scale and the social priority (safety), the vision needed to be adopted at all levels before implementation could take place.	Because of the social pressure and political priority, the vertical integration was very strong. This has also led to an institutionally complex situation, which hampers effectiveness.
4. Appealing model	Yes	The pilot in 'De Gelderse Poort' proved the model was successful and could be applied to the rest of the river system. Strength of the model is that the general public could use the areas for recreational activities without too much regulation. This – and the enhanced safety – increased acceptance tremendously.	
5. Conservation coalition	Partially	The vision was innovative and all local conservation partners benefited during implementation.	WWF took a strong leading role in the beginning, focusing on the involvement of non-conservation partners. The conservation coalition became stronger later on, especially after the vision was developed.
6. Widespread adoption	Yes	The basic principles are very attractive and applicable to different situations.	The basic principles proved to be acceptable to different contexts. Basic opposition comes almost always from those lobbying for traditional civil engineering solutions. Interestingly this was true to both in the Netherlands and China.
7. Exit strategy	Unclear	The Vision was to be adopted from the start by all other actors. WWF initiated mainly the pilot in 'De Gelderse Poort' after which the concept was to be adopted by others.	There was an exit strategy related to the pilot in relation to the overall program. However, WWF is still involved and how and when WWF stops is not (yet) clear.